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Public housing increasingly commands public attention.
Scarcely a day goes by without reports in the media about the
physical, managerial, and social problems that plague some pub-
licly-owned housing developments. Accounts of appalling apart-
ment conditions,1 corrupt administrators,' and innocent bystand-
ers killed by gang warfare s are commonplace. Negative images of
public housing have even found their way into popular culture.
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ton School. I would like to thank Vicki Been and Bob Ellickson for providing helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft and the Institute for Law and Economics of the University of
Pennsylvania for financial assistance. An earlier draft of this article was presented at the
Institute for Law and Economics Roundtable on Future Directions in Housing Policy.
I See, for example, Zachare Ball and Bill McGraw, U.S. Threatens to Sue City Over
Public Housing Woes, Detroit Free Press B4 (Oct 30, 1992) (one-third of Detroit's public
housing units are vacant and boarded up); Scott Harper, Auditors Give An "F" For Up-
keep; Say City Flunking At Allen Parkway Village, Houston Post A27 (Dec 18, 1992) (none
of the units inspected at Houston public housing development met federal standards); Pat-
rick T. Reardon, CHA Reeling From Years of Maintenance Neglect, Chi Trib B1 (Nov 2,
1992) (thousands of Chicago public housing units are unlivable).
I See, for example, Chris Collins, Public Housing Executives Exposed; Audits Cite
Managers For Misusing Assets, Houston Post A4 (Nov 30, 1992) (audits disclose that top
managers of PHAs misappropriated or misused public funds); William Raspberry, Scandal
In Public Housing, Wash Post All (Sep 30, 1991) (report describing corruption at PHAs);
Dale Russakoff, U.S. Seizes Philadelphia Public Housing Authority: HUD Acts After Polit-
ical Corruption Charge, Wash Post A3 (May 20, 1992) (patronage at the Philadelphia Hous-
ing Authority has led to waste of subsidies).
3 See, for example, Kevin Johnson, For Kids, Nowhere To Hide: Gunfire Part of Life in
Chicago Projects, U.S.A. Today A3 (Oct 15, 1992) (children at public housing project killed
as a result of gang violence); Robert D. McFadden, Brooklyn Principal Shot To Death
While Looking for Missing Pupil, NY Times Al (Dec 18, 1992) (principal shot in crossfire
at a public housing project in Red Hook, Brooklyn); Kevin Moran, Boy Slain in Galveston
Gang Gunfire; 2nd Teen Wounded in Latest of Yearlong String of Killings, Houston
Chronicle Al (Dec 18, 1991) (youth killed in gang-related drive-by shooting).
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Bestsellers have recounted the hardships of life in public housing,4
while films depict life in public housing as a horror story.5
In 1989, Congress established the National Commission on Se-
verely Distressed Public Housing and charged it with devising a
National Action Plan to eradicate severely distressed public hous-
ing by the end of the century.' The Commission's report, released
in 1992, recommends several policies to deal with distressed public
housing including an ambitious and potentially expensive plan to
renovate physically deteriorated projects.7 Legislation passed in
the closing days of the 102nd Congress implemented some of the
proposals, including a program to fund renovation of "obsolete"
developments.8
The Commission seems to have assumed that distressed public
housing should be preserved regardless of cost. Absent from the
Commission's report is any analysis of whether investing limited
public resources in distressed public housing developments is the
most desirable means to help low income households obtain "a de-
cent home and a suitable living environment."" In this Article, I
conclude that rather than spending scarce resources to refurbish
severely distressed public housing, Congress should instead make it
easier for local authorities to demolish this housing and replace it
with demand-oriented subsidies such as housing vouchers. In most
housing markets, demand-oriented subsidies would enable house-
holds to obtain decent housing in environments more desirable
than public housing.
The federal government should take steps, however, to pre-
vent the vast majority of public housing that is now viable from
4 See, for example, Alex Kotlowitz, There Are No Children Here: The Story of Two
Boys Growing Up In the Other America (Doubleday, 1991) (describing lives of two children
in Chicago's Henry Horner homes); Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land: The Great
Black Migration and How It Changed America 225-31, 295-97 (Knopf, 1991) (describing
family living in Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes).
5 See Candyman (TriStar Pictures, 1992). For less grisly, but no less disturbing, depic-
tions, see MenaceII Society (New Line Cinema, 1993); New Jack City (Warner Bros.,
1991); Straight Out of Brooklyn (Samuel Goldwyn Co., 1991).
6 See Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act of 1989, Pub L No
101-235, §§ 501-07, 103 Stat 1987, 2048-52 (1989).
7 See National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, The Final Report
9-31 (GPO, 1992) ("Commission Report") (summarizing the National Action Plan).
' See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-550, §§ 111,
120, 106 Stat 3672, 3686, 3701 (1992), codified at 42 USCA §§ 1437c, 1437v (West, 1993
Supp). See text accompanying notes 161-62.
9 Housing Act of 1949, Pub L No 81-171, § 2, 63 Stat 413 (1949) (proclaiming the na-
tional housing goal to be "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every Ameri-
can family").
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becoming severely distressed. Cost-effective repairs should be
funded to forestall future deterioration. Yet maintaining the physi-
cal plants of most public housing is the easiest part of the task.
Steps must also be taken to make public housing developments
safe and healthy living environments. Among the most important
initiatives that government can undertake are policies that reduce
the concentration and isolation of very poor people in public
housing.
I. THE PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM
Under the Housing Act of 1937,10 local public housing authori-
ties ("PHAs"),"1 rather than the federal government, build, own,
and operate housing for low and moderate income households.' 2
Once a municipality decides to participate in the program, it estab-
lishes a PHA, which executes an Annual Contributions Contract
with the federal government.' s Under the contract, the PHA funds
the purchase of land and the capital costs of the housing by issuing
long term bonds, typically with a forty-year maturity.14 The federal
government agrees to make all interest payments on the bonds, ef-
10 Pub L No 75-412, 50 Stat 888 (1937), codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 1437 et seq
(1992).
11 A public housing authority is a municipal corporation created pursuant to state ena-
bling legislation. Typically, a PHA is governed by a board of commissioners appointed by
the mayor and city council of the jurisdiction in which it is located. Currently there are
nearly 3,400 PHAs in the United States. See Charles E. Daye et al, Housing and Commu-
nity Development: Cases and Materials 132-35 (2d ed 1989); John P. Vitella and Wayne H.
Sherwood, Report #92-2: Trends in Public Housing Budgets and Finances 1975-1990 1
(Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, Oct 1992) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
12 Congress chose PHAs as the ownership entities because earlier efforts by the federal
government itself to acquire land for subsidized housing had been thwarted by federal
courts on the ground that housing was not a public purpose under the Takings Clause. See
United States v Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F2d 684, 687 (6th Cir 1935) (federal gov-
ernment cannot use power of eminent domain to assemble sites for public housing because
the provision of housing to low-salaried workers and residents of slum districts is not a
public purpose). State courts had already decided that states and localities could constitu-
tionally use their powers of eminent domain to provide low-cost housing. See, for example,
New York City Housing Authority v Muller, 270 NY 333, 1 NE2d 153, 156 (1936) (uphold-
ing the creation of a housing authority because the legislation aimed to protect and safe-
guard the entire public from the menace of the slums). Specially formed authorities were
used instead of general purpose municipal governments, so as to insulate the public housing
program from politics and to avoid statutory borrowing limits. See Elizabeth Wood, The
Beautiful Beginnings The Failure To Learn: Fifty Years of Public Housing in America 12-
13 (National Center for Housing Management, 1982).
1" The contract's terms and conditions are entered on a standard form. See U.S. Dep't
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), Annual Contributions Contract (Nov 1969)
("Contributions Contract") (on file with U Chi L Rev).
1" In some cases, maturity may be extended to 60 years. Id at Part One, 4.
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fectively underwriting the full capital cost of the development.1 5
The PHA, in turn, promises to operate the public housing accord-
ing to federal statutes and regulations.'" The municipality in which
the project is built must sign a Cooperation Agreement granting
the project an exemption from real property taxes.'7
Due to the outbreak of World War II, few housing units were
built under the 1937 Act. 8 After the war, Congress passed the
Housing Act of 1949,1 providing federal subsidies for slum clear-
ance and urban redevelopment. 20 Though the Act revived the pub-
lic housing program and authorized the construction of an addi-
tional 810,000 housing units, the apartments were not all
constructed until 1972.21 At that time, the federal government
changed directions in housing policy and began to subsidize pri-
vate developers of low-income housing.22
In recent years, the construction of public housing units has
slowed to a trickle.23 Presently, there are 1.4 million units of public
11 Under the 1937 Act, the federal government subsidized public housing in two ways.
The maximum value of annual contributions was the going federal interest rate at the time
the Annual Contributions Agreement was entered into, plus one percent of the development
or acquisition cost of the housing. See Pub L No 75-412, § 10(b), 50 Stat at 892. Alterna-
tively, federal capital grants would cover 25% of the cost of the dwellings. See id, § 11(a),
50 Stat at 893. Since the mid-1980s, the federal government has given loans or grants di-
rectly to PHAs rather than require them to issue bonds. See 42 USC §§ 1437b(a),
1437c(a)(2) (Supp 1992).
18 Contributions Contract at Part One, 3 (cited in note 13).
17 Id.
18 From 19a7 to 1948, 117,000 units of public housing were constructed. See James Rus-
sell Prescott, Economic Aspects of Public Housing 24 (Sage, 1974).
19 Pub L No 81-171, 63 Stat 413 (1949). In 1974, Congress barred new loans or grants
under this program after January 1, 1975. Pub L No 93-383, § 116(a), (b), (f), (g), 88 Stat
652, 653 (1974).
11 The slum clearance program became known as the Urban Renewal Program. See gen-
erally Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal
1949-1962 (M.I.T., 1964); James Q. Wilson, ed, Urban Renewal: The Record and the Con-
troversy (M.I.T., 1966); Marc A. Weiss, The Origins and Legacy of Urban Renewal, in J.
Paul Mitchell, ed, Federal Housing Policies and Programs Past and Present 253 (Center for
Urban Policy Research, 1985).
2' See J. Paul Mitchell, Historical Overview of Direct Federal Housing Assistance, in
Mitchell, ed, Federal Housing Policies at 187, 195 (cited in note 20).
22 In early 1973, President Nixon imposed a moratorium on all new commitments for
subsidized housing programs. See R. Allen Hays, The Federal Government and Urban
Housing: Ideology and Change in Public Policy 133-34 (S.U.N.Y., 1985). In 1974, the fed-
eral government enacted legislation establishing what came to be known as the "Section 8
Housing Assistance Program," which subsidized developers of new and substantially reha-
bilitated housing as well as tenants living in existing housing. See Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-383, § 201(a), 88 Stat 633, 662.
11 The average annual number of public housing starts from 1980 to 1984 was 32,147;
from 1985 to 1989, the average was 7,149. See Michael A. Stegman, The Limits of Privatiza-
tion, in More Housing, More Fairly: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on
Distressed Public Housing
housing in over 10,000 developments.24 Although most PHAs have
relatively small stocks of public housing, the largest two percent of
authorities own almost half of all units.25 Close to half of all units
are located in family projects containing over two hundred dwell-
ings.26 Most of the problems commonly associated with severely
distressed public housing are concentrated in these family projects.
II. DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING
Although most public housing developments in the United
States provide decent and safe homes for their residents,27 a rela-
tively small but growing proportion of projects exhibit distress.2 8
This distress may be a result of physical deterioration, social
problems, or a combination of the two phenomena. In this Section,
I examine the extent and causes of public housing distress.
A. Physical Distress
A recent study prepared for the Commission on Severely Dis-
tressed Public Housing estimates that the total cost to modernize
public housing ranges from $14.5 billion to $29.2 billion.29 The
Affordable Housing 23, 26 (Twentieth Century Fund, 1991). See also Cushing N. Dolbeare,
At A Snail's Pace FY1993: A Source Book on the Proposed 1993 Budget and How It Com-
pares to Prior Years (Low Income Housing Information Service, 1992) (Table 3 shows that
the incremental number of conventional public housing units reserved fell from 31,834 in
1980 to 10,000 in 1991.).
U See Vitella and Sherwood, Trends in Public Housing at 1 (cited in note 11).
25 Over 86% of all PHAs are small, owning fewer than 500 units of housing. Neverthe-
less, the 2% of all PHAs with over 2,500 units own close to half the nation's stock of public
housing. See National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, The Many
Faces of Public Housing 28 (NAHRO, 1990).
26 Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, Public Housing Today 16 (CLPHA,
1988) (citing data from 1982). About one-quarter of all public housing units are located in
developments primarily occcupied by elderly households. Id.
7 See Commission Report at 2 (cited in note 7) (6% of public housing stock is severely
distressed); Ronald Jones, David Kaminsky, and Michael Roanhouse, Problems Affecting
Low-Rent Public Housing Projects 2-3 (HUD, 1979) (seven hundred public housing
projects, containing 15% of the nation's public housing stock, can be characterized as
"troubled"). Note that in the contexts of these reports, "severely distressed" and "troubled"
are defined differently. Thus, comparing the dates of these reports and the percentages re-
ported does not indicate a decrease in problems over time.
" "Distress," as used in this Article, departs from the definition of "severely distressed
public housing" contained in the report of the National Commission on Severely Distressed
Housing. See Commission Report at B-1 (cited in note 7).
2, See ICF, Inc., The Modernization Needs of Severely Distressed Public Housing, in
Compilation of Unedited Technical Working Drafts Prepared For the National Commis-
sion on Severely Distressed Public Housing As of June 1, 1992 3 (ICF, 1992) ("Compila-
tion") (on file with U Chi L Rev). The authors of the ICF report used data from a number
of sources in arriving at their estimates. The single most important source of data was an
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lower estimate represents the cost of bringing all existing building
systems into working order; the higher figure reflects the additional
cost that PHAs would incur if they undertook lead paint abate-
ment, reconfiguration to assure future viability and full project
modernization. Approximately two-thirds of all public housing
units in the United States require physical renovations that cost
over $10,000.30 Furthermore, while only 5.5 percent of the public
housing stock requires work that would exceed $40,000 per unit,
renovating these units would consume over 18 percent of a fully
funded modernization program.3 1
The rather large backlog of modernization needs is partly due
to the financial structure of the public housing program created by
the 1937 Act. The 1937 Act made no provision for maintenance or
modernization. The federal government financed the construction
of the housing, but operating expenses such as maintenance were,
for the most part, to be covered by rents charged to tenants.2 In
addition, the Act forbade the type of prudent planning for even-
tual modernization that a private real estate developer would un-
dertake since PHAs were not permitted to accumulate reserves in
excess of one-half of one year's rent roll. Rent surpluses exceeding
this amount were offset against federal contributions."
The replacement reserve limits were not the federal govern-
ment's only contribution t6 the high current cost of renovation.
The 1937 Act was vehemently opposed by business interests such
as the United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Associa-
tion of Real Estate Boards, and the United States Savings and
Loan League. These groups feared public housing would compete
with private landlords and home builders for customers. 4 Al-
though they were unable to defeat the public housing program,
their influence permeates the legislation. The 1937 Act placed rela-
tively low ceilings on construction expenditures to ensure that the
units would not be desirable enough to compete with private-sector
inventory of modernization needs compiled in 1985 by Abt Associates. Id at 2, citing Dixon
Bain et al, Study of the Modernization Needs of the Public and Indian Housing Stock (Abt
Associates, 1988).
"o See ICF, Modernization Needs at 8 (cited in note 29).
31 Id.
32Nevertheless, the drafters of the 1937 Act probably thought that the annual federal
contributions would include some funds to help pay for operating expenses. See note 81.
11 See Eugene J. Meehan, The Quality of Federal Policymaking: Programmed Failure
in Public Housing 28 (Missouri, 1979).
" See Leonard Freedman, Public Housing: The Politics of Poverty 58-62 (Holt, Rine-
hart & Winston, 1969); Timothy L. McDonnell, The Wagner Housing Act: A Case Study of
the Legislative Process 60-62 (Loyola, 1957).
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housing.35 In addition, Congress required that projects built under
the Act "not be of elaborate or expensive design or materials, and
[that] economy be promoted both in construction and
administration.""8
Although some commentators have indicated that the first
housing projects built under the Act were of fairly good quality,37
contemporaneous articles indicate that the quality limitations ex-
plicit in the Act manifested themselves in the finished buildings. A
1949 article noted that although public housing provided better ac-
commodations than slum housing, the program's "belief in 'mini-
mum charity' is translated into accommodations that are often
pared to the bone in room size, equipment, noise insulation, cup-
boards, and floor covering. A government study reported that
many units required about eighty-five dollars to bring the dwell-
ings up to tenants' standards. 3 8 By the late 1950s, housing experts
agreed that mistakes were being made in both the quality and de-
sign of public housing.39
Economy frequently led PHAs to use nondurable materials in
the buildings' structures and internal systems. 40 Many public hous-
ing developments lack sufficient insulation, have defective roofs,
3' Pub L No 75-412, § 15(5), 50 Stat 888, 896 (1937). The Senate report accompanying
the housing bill made clear that public housing should not compete with decent private
sector housing: "[W]hatever housing is assisted by this bill will compete only with the sordid
conditions of urban and rural slums, and not with any private enterprise that is supplying
decent, safe and sanitary homes for families of moderate needs." Creating a United States
Housing Authority, S Rep No 933, 75th Cong, 1st Sess 15 (1937). The statute's income ceil-
ings also were designed to ensure that the housing would only be available to low income
households. See text accompanying notes 82, 85.
3" Pub L No 75-412, § 15(5), 50 Stat at 896.
'7 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Government and Slum Housing: a Century of Frustra-
tion 119-20 (Rand McNally, 1968) ("In the cities, low-rise projects, though never architec-
tural masterpieces, do blend in with their surroundings."); Gwendolyn Wright, Building The
Dream: A Social History of Housing in America 230 (1981) ("Much early public housing
testified to both economy and innovation.... There was often a high level of design, tech-
nology, and 'livability,' as public housing gave planners and architects an opportunity to
experiment.").
" John P. Dean, The Myths of Housing Reform, 14 Am Soc Rev 281, 287 (1949).
' In 1957, one of the most influential proponents of the 1937 Act, Catherine Bauer,
published an indictment of the public housing program in which she criticized the manner
in which projects were constructed and their effect on tenants. Catherine Bauer, The Dreary
Deadlock of Public Housing, 106 Arch Forum 139 (1957).
40 But see Richard F. Muth, Public Housing: An Economic Evaluation 16-18 (American
Enterprise Institute, 1973). Muth has noted that the nature of the subsidy provided by the
federal government creates an incentive for PHAs to substitute capital for current expendi-
tures. PHAs, at least in theory, have an incentive to use durable materials in projects since
construction costs will be completely subsidized whereas the costs of maintenance will
largely be paid for out of tenant rents.
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and obsolete mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems which
are in need of major overhaul.41 The design of individual apart-
ments also reflects the need to conserve on resources. Rooms are
typically very small; dining areas, for example, often have insuffi-
cient space to permit families to eat together. Closets were usually
built without doors, bathrooms without showers or showerheads.42
Although not attributable to undue frugality, many units also con-
tain materials since determined to be hazardous, such as lead paint
and asbestos. 43
If the design and construction of individual apartments is
problematic, the design and location of many developments is cat-
astrophic. In addition to advocating that PHAs build units cheaply
and rent them exclusively to low-income households, 44 the private
interest groups that feared competition from public housing influ-
enced Congress to require the elimination of one unit of substan-
dard housing for each unit of public housing constructed.45 This
"equivalent elimination" requirement not only prevented an in-
crease in the aggregate housing supply, but also precluded subur-
ban jurisdictions from participating in the program, since they typ-
ically had few units of substandard housing to be demolished. 6
Instead, public housing was concentrated in cities, where land is
typically more expensive. PHAs were, therefore, forced to build at
high densities to spread the cost over more units.4
In addition to contributing to the social problems that result
from concentrating poor households together,48 high-density hous-
ing is prone to deterioration and vandalism. Dense apartment
buildings are now generally thought to be inappropriate living en-
vironments for poor families with children.49 Mechanical systems
"I See Epp Associates et al, Capital Improvement Programs and the Physical Condi-
tion of Public Housing in Compilation at 57 (cited in note 29) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
4' See Raymond J. Struyk, A New System For Public Housing: Salvaging A National
Resource 34 (Urban Institute, 1980) (describing the "penurious" character of public housing
construction).
43 See Epp Associates et al, Capital Improvements Program at 57-58 (cited in note 41).
" See text accompanying notes 34-36.
Pub L No 75-412, § 10(a), 50 Stat at 891-92.
46 A former federal commissioner of the public housing program told a Congressional
hearing, "if there were no slums in the locality, regardless of how acute the housing shortage
was, and if we knew that we could not get the equivalent elimination required by the Act,
we could not go in there." Wood, The Beautiful Beginnings at 11 (cited in note 12).
4, See Friedman, Government and Slum Housing at 120 (cited in note 37).
4' See text accompanying notes 137-51.
' Congress adopted this view in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub
L No 90-448, § 207, 82 Stat 476, 504. ("Secretary shall not approve high-rise elevator
projects for families with children unless he makes a determination that there is no practical
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such as elevators constantly break down as a result of heavy usage.
Parents cannot adequately supervise their children because recrea-
tional facilities are frequently at a distance. The large number of
people sharing common facilities make it difficult for residents to
know their neighbors and maintain building security.50 Inadequate
recreational facilities, insufficient opportunities for parental moni-
toring of children, and an absence of building security contribute
to vandalism and further deterioration of facilities.
Although the incentives created by the 1937 Housing Act
would themselves probably have resulted in a rather high level of
building deterioration, Congress's actions in the late 1960s exacer-
bated the downward spiral. Rents from the public housing program
were originally expected to cover most, if not all, operating costs. 51
But in the late 1950s and 1960s, the operating costs of public hous-
ing rose because of aging buildings and inflation, while the incomes
of tenants lagged behind the resulting rent increases.2 Faced with
rent strikes and tenant unrest, Congress passed the 1969 Brooke
Amendment, which capped rents at twenty-five percent of in-
come.53 The Amendment plunged PHAs into financial turmoil, and
many were forced to defer maintenance. Although Congress en-
acted a program of operating subsidies in 1970,"' the money pro-
vided was insufficient to maintain the properties.5
The physical deterioration that plagues a significant portion of
the nation's public housing stock cannot be attributed solely to the
federal government and the tenants. A share of the responsibility
also rests with PHAs, whose duty it is to build and operate the
alternative"). But see J.S. Fuerst and Roy Petty, High-rise Housing for Low-Income Fami-
lies, The Public Interest 118, 130 (Spring 1991) (arguing that high-rise buildings are not
necessarily related to public housing problems).
50 See Oscar Newman, Defensible Space 15-18 (Macmillan, 1972). Building security is
also compromised by design defects. For example, elevators frequently do not stop on every
floor, thereby forcing residents to use unsecured stairwells. Wright, Building the Dream at
236 (cited in note 37). In addition, "superblock" projects require individuals to walk along
isolated routes rather than enter off a well-trafficked street. Newman, Defensible Space at
25.
51 There is some ambiguity in the 1937 Act about whether Congress expected all oper-
ating costs to be paid out of rent. See note 81.
According to one account, the poorest tenants paid as much as three-quarters of their
income in rent and rent-to-income burdens of one-half were commonplace. Meehan, The
Quality of Federal Policymaking at 26 (cited in note 33).
53 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub L No 91-152, § 213(a), 83 Stat
379, 389 (1970).
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-609, § 210, 84 Stat 1770,
1778-79.
56 Meehan, The Quality of Federal Policymaking at 37 (cited in note 33).
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housing. Although there are no systematic nationwide evaluations
of PHA management practices, allegations of mismanagement are
ubiquitous.58 HUD has characterized twenty-one large urban PHAs
that own eighteen percent of the nation's public housing stock as
"troubled" because they maintain insufficient operating reserves,
have poor maintenance programs, badly deteriorated units or
unacceptably high vacancy rates. 7 Evaluations of individual PHAs
reveal specific management problems. Apartments frequently do
not meet applicable health and safety requirements.58 Further de-
cay results from the often inordinate length of time required to
complete simple repairs . e Delays in leasing vacant apartmentse0
contribute to further deterioration as the units are vandalized.
PHAs have also been accused of laxity in evicting tenants who en-
gage in damaging or unlawful behavior.8 1 In some jurisdictions,
management problems have become so severe that HUD has effec-
tively placed the PHA in receivership. 2
56 See Rachel G. Bratt, Public Housing Authorities: Determining an Appropriate Role
in a National Preservation Strategy, 2 Housing Policy Debate 535, 540 (1991) ("Unfortu-
nately, inadequate management is one of the most frequently heard criticisms of public
housing."); Robert Kolodny, Management Problems in U.S. Public Housing and Possible
Lessons For Abroad, in Niels L. Prak and Hugo Priemus, eds, Post-War Public Housing In
Trouble 11, 15-16 (Delft University, The Netherlands, 1985) (describing public housing
management problems).
11 See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Public Housing Ills Lead To Questions About H.U.D.,
NY Times A8 (Jul 20, 1992).
" HUD, Office of Inspector General, Philadelphia Housing Authority Management
and Selected Development Operations 3 (1992) (of 87 public housing units inspected, 86
were not in good repair); US General Accounting Office, Public Housing: Chicago Housing
Authority Taking Steps To Address Long-Standing Problems 15 (1989) (93% of the apart-
ments inspected had "many serious physical problems"). See also sources cited in note 1.
59 See, for example, HUD, Philadelphia Housing Authority at 13 (cited in note 58)
(only about half of all reported repair work orders were completed within the federally spec-
ified three-day period); Rene Sanchez, D.C. Council Hears Dismal Tales of Public Housing
Repair Delays, Wash Post B8 (Mar 1, 1992) (testimony describes long delays in repairing
apartment plumbing and roofs).
60 See, for example, HUD, Philadelphia Housing Authority at 9 (cited in note 58)
(Philadelphia Housing Authority has an overall vacancy rate of 20.5%; the average period of
vacancy for conventional public housing units in the city is 1,563 days); James Lawless,
Report Critical of CMHA; Repairs, Spending Come Under Fire, Cleveland Plain Dealer B1
(Oct 4, 1992) (HUD audit finds 31% vacancy rate in Cleveland PHA).
8" See Bratt, Public Housing Authorities at 541 (cited in note 56). In part, delays in
eviction reflect procedural requirements. See text accompanying notes 119-20.
12 See, for example, Hinds, Public Housing Ills at AS (cited in note 57) (since 1989,
HUD has taken partial or full control over six PHAs); Matthew Purdy, U.S. Will Run Hous-
ing Authority; Saidel is To Quit As Chairman, Philadelphia Inquirer Al (May 21, 1992)
(HUD takes over Philadelphia Housing Authority).
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B. Social Distress
Distinguishing between physical and social distress, while use-
ful for the purpose of exposition, creates a false dichotomy. Design
flaws lead to vandalism and the deterioration of bricks and mortar;
but they also diminish the residents' quality of life. Individual
households must live in apartments with leaky roofs, broken
plumbing and insufficient heat. High levels of deterioration also
encourage tenants with the most resources to move elsewhere
thereby increasing the concentration of poverty within the devel-
opment."3 Vacant units are vandalized and frequently used for ille-
gal purposes, such as drug distribution or consumption. The flow
of non-residents into these units reduces safety and leads remain-
ing households to move elsewhere until what is left of the commu-
nity is destroyed.
Nevertheless, physical distress need not exist for the residents
of public housing to experience social distress. Like the inner cities
in which many developments are located, most public housing
projects shelter an increasingly impoverished and isolated popula-
tion. This concentration of poverty in large urban public housing
developments is explained both by demographic changes affecting
American cities over the past four decades and by policies embed-
ded in the public housing program. The poverty of public housing
residents would cause them hardship and distress even if they
lived in economically integrated communities. However, the enor-
mously high concentration of poverty in many public housing de-
velopments generates social problems for tenants that are both dif-
ferent in kind and magnitude from the problems faced by poor
people in less concentrated settings. High rates of crime, drug
abuse and detachment from the labor market are some of the con-
sequences of concentrated poverty for residents of public housing.
1. The causes of concentrated poverty in urban public
housing.
The concentration of poverty in public housing developments
is partially attributable to demographic trends that have affected
most large cities. In recent years, concentrated inner city poverty
has increased dramatically in large American cities, particularly in
63 For a discussion of the negative effects of concentrated poverty, see text accompany-
ing notes 137-51.
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the Northeast and Midwest.6 Paul Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane
find that from 1970 to 1980, the number of people with incomes
below the poverty level living in census tracts where over forty per-
cent of the population were poor increased by 29.5%, from 1.9 mil-
lion to 2.4 million.6 5 Additional research shows that the concentra-
tion of poverty in large urban areas continued to grow in the
1980s,66 and that concentrated poverty affects black households
with much greater frequency than white households.
67
The concentration of inner city poverty has many causes.
Since the end of World War II, middle and upper income house-
holds have poured out of cities and into the suburbs."8 Central cit-
ies have also lost a tremendous number of low-skilled jobs to the
suburbs and foreign nations.6 9 Many of the jobs that remain in the
United States are now inaccessible to low-income residents of in-
ner cities.7 0 This inaccessibility stems from restrictive suburban
For more detailed examinations of the causes of concentrated poverty and legal strat-
egies for remedying the problem, see generally Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating The In-
ner City Poor, 67 Chi Kent L Rev 795 (1991); Michael H. Schill, The Federal Role in Re-
ducing Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing in the Suburbs, 8 J L & Pol 703 (1992).
" Paul A. Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane, Ghetto Poverty in the United States 1970-
1980, in Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson, eds, The Urban Underclass 235, 252
(Brookings, 1991). See also Mark A. Hughes, Misspeaking Truth to Power: A Geographical
Perspective on the "Underclass" Fallacy, 65 Econ Geography 187, 194 (1989); John C.
Weicher, How Poverty Neighborhoods Are Changing, in Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. and Michael
G.H. McGeary, eds, Inner-City Poverty in the United States 68, 70 (National Academy
Press, 1990).
See John D. Kasarda, Inner-City Poverty and Economic Access, in Jack Sommer
and Donald A. Hicks, eds, Rediscovering Urban America: Perspectives on the 1980s, 4-1, 4-
39 to 4-44 (HUD, 1993); Richard P. Nathan and Charles F. Adams, Jr., Four Perspectives
on Urban Hardship, 104 Pol Sci Q 483, 501 (1989).
67 See Jargowsky and Bane, Ghetto Poverty at 252 (cited in note 65) (in 1980, 65% of
the ghetto poor were black, 22% Hispanic, and 13% non-Hispanic white and other races.);
Nathan and Adams, 104 Pol Sci Q at 504 (cited in note 66) (in 1986, more than 75% of all
poor urban black households lived in concentrated poverty, compared to 43% of poor urban
white households).
68 For a discussion of the causes of population decentralization in large metropolitan
areas, see generally Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the
United States (Oxford, 1985).
a9 See John D. Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass, 501 Annals
Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 26, 29-30 (1989) (in the 1970s, large northern cities lost large num-
bers of jobs in clerical, sales, and blue-collar employment whereas their suburbs gained jobs
in all occupational categories).
70 The first proponent of the spatial mismatch hypothesis was John F. Kain, Housing
Segregation, Negro Employment and Metropolitan Decentralization, 82 Q J Econ 175
(1968). The bulk of empirical evidence supports Kain's hypothesis that the inner city loca-
tion of poor households disadvantages them in either obtaining a job or in the amount of
their wages. See, for example, Harry J. Holzer, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What
Has the Evidence Shown?, 28 Urb Stud 105, 118 (1991) ("It seems fair to say, therefore,
that the preponderance of evidence from data of the last decade shows that spatial mis-
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land use practices that raise the price of housing in the suburbs
beyond the reach of low-income households, 1 and from inadequate
public transportation that prevents potential employees living in
central cities from commuting to suburban employment centers. 2
In addition, households living at great distances from sources of
employment are less likely to learn about employment
opportunities.7 1
To the extent that jobs have been created in central cities,
they typically pay lower wages or require higher levels of skill than
the manufacturing jobs that departed.74 And while the educational
requirements for inner-city jobs have increased, the quality of edu-
cation has apparently declined. Reductions in municipal fiscal ba-
ses have starved many inner-city school districts of the funds they
require to offer their students appropriate class sizes, educational
materials and technical facilities. 7 5 Large proportions of inner-city
students drop out before graduation and are particularly ill-
equipped to compete in the urban job market. 6
match has a significant effect on black employment."); Schill, 67 U Chi Kent L Rev at 800
(cited in note 64) ("Although the results of these tests are not all consistent, the weight of
the evidence supports the argument that the location of inner city poor households, espe-
cially black households living in the older cities of the North and Midwest, creates a disad-
vantage for them in escaping poverty."). But see Christopher Jencks and Susan E. Mayer,
Residential Segregation, Job Proximity, and Black Job Opportunities, in Lynn and Mc-
Geary, eds, Inner-City Poverty in the United States at 187, 218 (cited in note 65) (the
findings of empirical studies on the spatial mismatch hypothesis "tell a very mixed story").
71 Suburban land use practices make housing unaffordable by requiring large minimum
lots or expensive subdivision amenities. In addition, many suburbs severely restrict the
quantity of multifamily housing that may be built. See Advisory Commission on Regulatory
Barriers to Affordable Housing, "Not in My Back Yard": Removing Barriers to Affordable
Housing 2-1 to 2-14 (1991).
71 See Keith R. Ihlanfeldt and David L. Sjoquist, The Impact of Job Decentralization
on the Economic Welfare of Central City Blacks, 26 J Urb Econ 110, 125 (1989) ("public
transit, even where it exists, normally does not serve the reverse commuter"); John D.
Kasarda, Urban Change and Minority Opportunities, in Paul E. Peterson, ed, The New
Urban Reality 33, 55 (Brookings, 1985).
73 See Katherine M. O'Regan and John M. Quigley, Labor Market Access and Labor
Market Outcomes For Urban Youth, 21 Regional Sci & Urb Econ 277, 291 (1991).
7' See Kasarda, Urban Change, in Peterson, ed, New Urban Reality at 33, 53-55 (cited
in note 72).
75 For one example of a court's attempt to redress educational inequities between inner
cities and suburbs, see Abbott v Burke, 119 NJ 287, 575 A2d 359, 377-408 (1990) (declaring
New Jersey's system for financing public schools unconstitutional under the New Jersey
Constitution).
76 See Kasarda, Urban Change, in Peterson, ed, New Urban Reality at 54-55 (cited in
note 72) ("large portions of black central city residents still do not possess the education to
participate in information-processing industries beginning to dominate urban employment
bases"); Jargowsky and Bane, Ghetto Poverty, in Jencks and Peterson, eds, The Urban Un-
derclass at 249 (cited in note 65) (in 1980, the median number of school years completed by
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Concentration of poverty in American cities has also been ex-
acerbated by race discrimination. Despite laws that prohibit dis-
crimination, blacks, Hispanics and other minorities continue to be
denied jobs because of the color of their skin.7 In addition,
twenty-five years after the Fair Housing Act was signed into law,
high levels of discrimination in the housing market still thwart mi-
nority households' ability to move to less concentrated
neighborhoods. 8
By itself, the increasing concentration of low-income house-
holds in inner-city neighborhoods would probably have led to a
high concentration of poor tenants in urban public housing. Never-
theless, embedded .in the program are several features that have
made public housing not just a microcosm of the inner city, but its
exaggeration. The commonly accepted view is that Congress never
expected public housing to become home to an extremely impover-
ished group of residents. Instead, public housing was designed for
the "submerged middle class" that had been dislocated during the
Great Depression and would soon be on its feet again. 9 Perhaps a
more accurate characterization of the program's history is that
members of Congress were not quite certain who should live in
public housing and that this ambivalence manifested itself over the
years in policies that, in retrospect, have had a deleterious effect
on the program.
The 1937 Act reflects the tension in Congress over whether
public housing should be available only to the lowest income
households in a municipality or should serve less destitute families
as well. The Act called for "decent, safe, and sanitary housing
within the financial reach of families of low income." "Families of
low income" meant "families who are in the lowest income group
and who cannot afford to pay enough to cause private enter-
prise . .. to build an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sani-
ghetto blacks in Memphis and Philadelphia were 9.5 and 10.8, respectively); Frank New-
man, Robert Palaich, and Rona Wilensky, Reengaging State and Federal Policymakers in
the Problems of Urban Education, in Marshall Kaplan and Franklin James, eds, The Fu-
ture of National Urban Policy 61, 68 (Duke, 1990) (43% drop-out rate in Chicago public
schools for the Class of 1982).
7 See Gerald D. Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds, A Common Destiny: Blacks
and American Society 146-48 (National Academy Press, 1989) (presenting data on employ-
ment discrimination).
78 See Margery A. Turner, Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets: Lessons From
Fair Housing Audits, 3 Housing Policy Debate 185, 197 (1992) ("The overall incidence of
discrimination against renters is 53% for blacks and 46% for Hispanics").
7 Lawrence M. Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 Cal L Rev
642, 646 (1966).
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tary dwellings for their use."' 0 Although members of both the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives stated that the program's
objective was to reach the lowest income households, they also rec-
ognized that tenants who had no income to pay rent would be inel-
igible.81 In the end, the 1937 Act set income limits indi-
rectly-tenants could earn no more than five times the rent they
paid for their homes.8 2
If the 1937 Act was somewhat ambiguous about what income
group public housing was to serve, the 1949 Housing Act clearly
sent the message that only the very poor need apply. The public
housing provisions in the 1949 Act were influenced by the need to
re-house families that would be displaced by the slum clearance
program set forth in Title I of the Act, as well as returning World
War II veterans. The Act provided that these two groups of appli-
cants would receive a preference in obtaining public housing."
Targeting assistance to former slum dwellers guaranteed that a
substantial proportion of the residents of public housing would
have very low incomes.
The 1949 Act included other provisions which filled public
housing with the very poor. Discrimination against households re-
ceiving public assistance was outlawed.8 4 PHAs were also in-
structed to set income ceilings subject to federal government ap-
proval. Households whose incomes rose above the prescribed
ceilings would be "required to move from the project."85 Interest-
s- Pub L No 75412, § 2(2), 50 Stat at 888 (emphasis added).
81 See, for example, Friedman, Government and Slum Housing at 109 (cited in note 37)
(quoting Senator Wagner: "obviously this bill cannot provide housing for those who cannot
pay the rent minus the subsidy allowed"); United States Housing Act of 1937, H Rep No
1545, 75th Cong, 1st Sess 6 (1937) ("It must be recognized, however, that as long as any rent
is to be charged in a project, the people who will occupy the dwellings must have some
income."). Friedman's argument that Congress must have contemplated tenants able to pay
all of the operating expenses of the project is probably incorrect. The subsidy provided by
the 1937 Act was not limited to capital costs. Although Congress capped federal contribu-
tions and required that they be used by PHAs first to pay off interest and principal on
loans, the Act does not limit the federal subsidy to capital costs. Section 10(b) of the Act
provides that "[a]nnual contributions shall be strictly limited to the amounts and periods
necessary... to assure the low-rent character of the housing projects involved." 50 Stat at
892. The House Report explicitly contemplates that these subsidies will be used to reduce
the amount tenants must pay to cover operating expenses. See H Rep No 1545 at 6.
"' Pub L No 75-412 § 2(1), 50 Stat at 888.
83 Pub L No 81-171 § 302, 63 Stat 413, 423 (1949).
- Id, § 301, 63 Stat at 423.
65 Id. The Act further required a 20% gap between the lowest rents available in the
private sector and the highest rents in public housing. Id. Since maximum incomes were
defined as a multiple of rent, see text accompanying note 82, the rent ceiling also functioned
as a limitation on income.
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ingly, the reasons given for the income ceilings were quite different
from the rationales offered by Congress in the early 1980s for simi-
lar rules." Rather than seeking to target assistance to those most
in need, the income ceilings seem to have been designed to protect
private landlords from competition. 7
From 1959 to 1974, Congress gradually chipped away at some
of the provisions limiting public housing to the lowest income
households. The Housing Act of 1959 eliminated the rule limiting
the income of tenants to five times the rent."8 The Housing Act of
1961 eviscerated the preferential treatment accorded certain espe-
cially needy groups of applicants and also removed the obligation
to evict households whose incomes exceeded maximum limits if
special circumstances made it impossible for them to obtain hous-
ing in the private market.8 9
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 first
established the reduction of geographically concentrated poverty
as an objective of federal housing policy. 0 In marked contrast to
earlier housing legislation, the Act required PHAs to establish ten-
ant selection criteria "to assure that, within a reasonable period of
time, the project will include families with a broad range of in-
comes and will avoid concentrations of low-income and deprived
families with serious social problems ..... ,1 Although the Act re-
quired that at least one-fifth of the dwellings be occupied by "very
low-income households" earning less than fifty percent of the
area's median income, it eliminated the requirement that PHAs set
86 See text accompanying note 94-95.
8 The Senate Report's description of the maximum income ceilings follows a short par-
agraph stating that "private enterprise has never had anything to fear from the low-rent
public housing program." Housing Act' of 1949, S Rep No 84, 81st Cong, 1st Sess (1949),
reprinted in 1949 USCCAN 1569-70.
88 Pub L No 86-372 § 503(a), 73 Stat 654, 680 (1980). The PHA would still set income
limits, but the statute indicated that it could take into account the "financial stability and
solvency of the project." Id.
89 Pub L No 87-70 § 205(a), 75 Stat 149, 164 (1960). The legislation replaced the
mandatory preference requirements with an exhortation to fully consider displaced house-
holds and veterans. Id. The legislative changes were justified on the ground that it was
desirable to give localities greater flexibility to shape their admissions policies to local condi-
tions. Housing Act of 1949, S Conf Rep No 602, 87th Cong, 1st Sess (1961), reprinted in
1961 USCCAN 2033.
90 The Act includes among its nine objectives "the reduction of the isolation of income
groups within communities and geographical areas and the promotion of an increase in the
diversity and vitality of neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing op-
portunities for persons of lower income ... ." Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, Pub L No 93-383 § 101(c)(6), 88 Stat 633, 634-35.
11 Id, § 201(a), 88 Stat at 653.
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income ceilings and evict over-income tenants.12 The Senate Re-
port accompanying the legislation expressed the concern that pub-
lic housing developments had become "a concentration of very
poor families" and the hope that a greater cross-section of families
would create "economically viable housing as well as a healthy so-
cial environment."9"
If the 1974 Act was Congress's most extensive effort to avoid
concentrating poor people in public housing, the Housing Act of
1981 was its strongest declaration that public housing should be
almost exclusively devoted to those who earn the lowest incomes.
Based upon the principle that scarce housing assistance dollars
should be targeted to those with the greatest need,9 ' the 1981 Act
required that ninety percent of all occupants in existing public
housing and ninety-five percent of the tenants in newly con-
structed buildings have very low incomes.9 5
Since 1983 the pendulum has once again slowly begun to swing
away from stringent targeting requirements. The minimum quota
for very low income households has been reduced to seventy-five
percent for pre-1981 public housing96 and eighty-five percent for
housing units developed after 1981.97 Although mandatory admis-
sion preferences have been reestablished and their coverage broad-
ened,98 legislation passed in 1992 limits their applicability to fifty
percent of a PHA's housing stock.99
" Id.
" Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, S Rep No 93-693, 93d Cong, 2d
Sess (1974), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 4273, 4311.
" See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, S Rep No 97-139, 97th Cong, 1st
Sess 228-29, reprinted in 1981 USCCAN 396, 524-25.
" Pub L No 97-35, § 323, 95 Stat 384, 405 (1982). "Very low income" was defined as
income below 50% of the area's median income. Id, § 322(b)(2), 95 Stat at 400.
" Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub L No 98-181, § 213, 97 Stat
1153, 1184 (1983).
97 Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub L No 101-625, § 511, 104
Stat 4085, 4194 (1990), codified at 42 USC § 1437n (1990).
" See Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1979, Pub L No 96-153,
§ 206(a), 93 Stat 1101, 1108 (1981) (establishing preferences for families occupying substan-
dard housing and those involuntarily displaced); Pub L No 98-181, § 203(a), 97 Stat at 1178
(extending preferences to households paying over 50% of their income for rent).
I Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-550, § 112, 106
Stat 3672, 3689 (1992), codified at 42 USC § 1437(d) (1992). The 1992 legislation also per-
mits PHAs to skip over lower income households on their waiting lists, as long as they
follow a local system of preferences. Id, § 105, 106 Stat at 3684, codified at 42 USC § 1437n.
The Act also extends ceiling rents permanently. Id, § 102, 106 Stat at 3683, codified at 42
USC 1437a. PHAs are permitted to establish rents below the normal 30% of income stan-
dard. See 42 USCA § 1437a. Ceiling rents are designed to encourage moderate income
households to remain in public housing.
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Although it has taken a lead role, Congress has not been alone
in contributing to the concentration and isolation of poor families
in public housing. In both their site and tenant selection policies,
PHAs have exacerbated the problem.100 Many PHAs built public
housing in large towers so as to conserve on land costs.101 In some
cities, such as Chicago, several large public housing developments
have been located in close proximity to each other, creating an
enormous phalanx of poverty.102 PHAs in other cities have isolated
public housing by restricting locations to the least desirable por-
tions of town, frequently areas already home to disproportionate
numbers of poor families.0 3
Racially discriminatory siting and leasing policies have also
helped concentrate the poorest people in certain developments.10 4
In most large cities, the poor are disproportionately composed of
racial minorities. Until the mid-1950s, racial discrimination in as-
signing tenants to public housing was official government policy in
many cities. 10 5 Black households would be assigned to certain de-
velopments; whites to others.0 6 Public housing was also dispropor-
tionately located in communities with high proportions of minority
100 Ineffective management practices have also driven away public housing tenants who
earned relatively higher incomes than those they left behind. See text accompanying notes
56-62.
101 See text accompanying notes 47-50.
102 See Arnold R. Hirsch, Making The Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago,
1940-1960 244 (Cambridge, 1983) (photograph depicting massive public housing develop-
ments as far as can be seen).
103 John F. Bauman, Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadel-
phia, 1920-1974 169 (Temple, 1987) ("All of the projects planned and built from 1956 to
1967 were sited in ghetto or 'transitional' neighborhoods."); Wilhelmina A. Leigh and Mil-
dred 0. Mitchell, Public Housing and the Black Community, 17 Rev Black Pol Econ 107,
121 (1988) ("many public housing projects were built on vacant land on the fringes of cities
in areas to which jobs never moved and which lack good public transit").
104 See Bauman, Public Housing at 167-74 (cited in note 103) (describing discrimina-
tory practices of Philadelphia Housing Authority); Rachel G. Bratt, Rebuilding a Low-In-
come Housing Policy 70-71 (Temple, 1989) (describing federal and local policies encourag-
ing racial discrimination in public housing); Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto at 212-58
(cited in note 102) (describing discriminatory practices of the Chicago Housing Authority);
Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning, & the Public Interest: The
Case of Public Housing in Chicago 134 (Collier-Macmillan, 1955) (describing 10% quota on
blacks in public housing in white areas of Chicago).
100 PHAs were instructed by the federal government to follow the "neighborhood com-
position rule," under which the racial make-up of public housing developments were sup-
posed to mirror their neighborhoods. See Mittie Olion Chandler, Public Housing Desegrega-
tion: What Are the Options?, 3 Housing Policy Debate 509, 518 (1992). See also Friedman,
Government and Slum Housing at 123 (cited in note 37) ("Race discrimination in public
housing was at one time fairly open and explicit.").
10" See Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto at 230 (cited in note 102) (certain public
housing projects were "reserved" for whites).
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households.10 7 Even after federal court rulings held these discrimi-
natory practices unconstitutional, 08 and a presidential directive
outlawed discrimination in public housing,10 9 the practices did not
cease. 110 The segregation in public housing of disproportionately
low-income minority families remains a staggering fact of urban
life.1 '
Some commentators have also blamed the courts for the con-
centration of poverty and deterioration of public housing."12 For
better or worse, in the early years of the program, PHAs had enor-
mous latitude in selecting applicants and evicting tenants."L3 Pub-
lic housing managers often used these powers to screen out poten-
tially troublesome tenants. 4 In the eviction context, PHAs were
treated by many courts as private landlords and were thus not re-
101 See Bauman, Public Housing at 169 (cited in note 103) (all of the projects planned
and built from 1956 to 1967 were sited in ghetto or "transitional" neighborhoods); Hirsch,
Making the Second Ghetto at 242-43 (cited in note 102) ("Of the thirty-three projects ap-
proved between 1950 and the mid-1960s, twenty-five and a 'substantial portion' of another
were located in census tracts containing a black population in excess of 75%."); Raymond A.
Mohl, Race and Space in the Modern City: Interstate 95 and the Black Community in
Miami, in Arnold R. Hirsch and Raymond A. Mohl, eds, Urban Policy in Twentieth Cen-
tury America 100, 132-33 (Rutgers, 1993) (in the 1960s, public housing was built in already
segregated areas of Miami). A recent study by Massey and Kanaiaupuni found a significant
relationship between the racial composition of Chicago census tracts in 1950 and whether
public housing was constructed in that tract. The greater the proportion of blacks in 1950,
the more likely that public housing would be built in that tract in the following 20 years.
Douglas S. Massey and Shawn M. Kanaiaupuni, Public Housing and the Concentration of
Poverty, 74 Soc Sci Q 109, 114-15 (1993).
108 See, for example, Heyward v Public Housing Administration, 238 F2d 689, 698 (5th
Cir 1956) (holding that black applicants for public housing could sue a PHA for race dis-
crimination); Detroit Housing Commission v Lewis, 226 F2d 180, 182-83 (6th Cir 1955) (up-
holding lower court decision that PHA illegally engaged in race discrimination).
"' Executive Order No 11063, 27 Fed Reg 11527, 3 CFR (1959-63 Comp) 652 (Nov 24,
1962) (directing federal agencies to prevent racial discrimination in housing financed or sup-
ported by the federal government).
110 See, for example, United States v Yonkers Bd. of Ed., 837 F2d 1181, 1235 (2d Cir
1987) (upholding a finding that city and school board had discriminated against minorities
in public housing).
2 See text accompanying notes 133, 137.
12 See, for example, J.S. Fuerst and Roy Petty, Due Process-How Much Is Enough?,
29 The Public Interest 96, 101 (Spring 1985).
1'3 See, for example, Manigo v New York City Housing Authority, 51 Misc 2d 829, 273,
NYS2d 1003, 1006 (Sup Ct, NY County 1966) (upholding rejection of tenant whose husband
had been arrested several times); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare:
The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L J 1245, 1250 (1965) ("[T]his power [to select and
oust tenants] can be exercised in a way that is largely discretionary, based in part upon
officials' intangible impressions from interviews and home visits.... The standards are gen-
erally vague, and there are no clearly articulated methods of proof. There may be little in
the way of procedure to make certain that the authorities' information is true.").
114 See Friedman, 54 Cal L Rev at 657 (cited in note 79).
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quired to accord tenants a hearing prior to lease termination or a
detailed explanation of why they were being evicted.11 5 This flexi-
bility with respect to admissions and evictions gave PHAs enor-
mous control over the lives of their tenants.1 6
Beginning in the late 1960s, however, public housing tenants
won substantial freedom from arbitrary PHA actions. In Holmes v
New York City Housing Authority,1 7 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that procedural due process required that
PHAs adopt "ascertainable standards" in their tenant selection
procedures. One year later, in Thorpe v Housing Authority of the
City of Durham,""' the Supreme Court ruled that PHAs must fol-
low a HUD directive requiring a hearing prior to lease termination.
Shortly thereafter, the Second Circuit firmly established the due
process rights of public housing tenants in Escalera v New York
City Housing Authority"' by requiring that prior to lease termina-
tion, PHAs offer tenants a hearing, permit them to inspect PHA
records, and enable them to cross-examine witnesses. Judicial deci-
sions limiting PHA discretion have not merely been addressed to
procedural matters. Admission and eviction standards that ex-
cluded unwed mothers or people with criminal records have also
been struck down as arbitrary. 20
Although critics of enhanced tenants' rights may unjustifiably
discount the harmful effects of government abuse, 2" they correctly
observe that the recent proliferation of procedural and substantive
'1 See, for example, Chicago Housing Authority v Stewart, 40 Il1 2d 23, 237 NE2d 463,
465 (1968) (no reason need be given for eviction of month-to-month tenant); Pittsburgh
Housing Authority v Turner, 201 Pa Super 62, 191 A2d 869, 871 (1963) (same); New York
City Housing Authority v Watson, 27 Misc 2d 618, 207 NYS2d 920, 922 (Sup Ct, NY
County 1960) (tenant may not contest finding of undesirability); Note, Public Landlords
and Private Tenants: The Eviction of "Undesirables" From Public Housing Projects, 77
Yale L J 988, 994 (1968) ("courts have usually treated the housing authority as an ordinary
landlord, who can have a tenant evicted merely by showing that he is holding over after the
lease has been terminated"). The landlord's power over tenants was magnified by the fact
that most public housing leases were month-to-month. Special Project: Public Housing, 22
Vand L Rev 875, 926 n 286 (1969) (public housing leases generally are month-to-month).
See also Reich, 74 Yale L J at 1250 (cited in note 113).
116 See Wright, Building the Dream at 237 (cited in note 37) ("Management controlled
every aspect of the residents' lives-the keeping of pets, the policy about overnight guests,
the color of paint on the walls, the schedules for using the washing machines.").
21 398 F2d 262, 265 (2d Cir 1968).
11s 393 US 268, 283 (1969).
219 425 F2d 853, 863 (2d Cir 1970).
120 See Thomas v Housing Authority of Little Rock, 282F Supp 575, 581 (E D Ark
1967); Tucker v Norwalk Housing Authority, Civ No B-251 (D Conn 1971), discussed in
National Housing Law Project, HUD Housing Programs: Tenants' Rights 2/14 (1981).
121 See note 113.
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safeguards contributes to the difficulties facing large urban PHAs.
PHAs may no longer deny admission to suspected "problem" te-
nants unless they can provide objective evidence of past misdeeds
and persuasive arguments that the applicants will likely interfere
with the health, safety, or welfare of other tenants.'22 In addition,
tenants may only be evicted for "good cause,' 123 which has gener-
ally been interpreted to require evidence of serious or repeated
misconduct. 2 Even when a PHA believes it has evidence to justify
eviction, it must accord tenants hearings prior to bringing a court
action for eviction. During this potentially lengthy period of ad-
ministrative hearings and court proceedings, undesirable tenants
usually may remain in possession of their homes, where they con-
tinue to engage in practices destructive to the community. 25
2. The extent of concentrated poverty in urban public
housing.
Whether motivated by a desire to direct assistance to those
most in need, race discrimination, or the desire to accord tenants
due process of law, Congress, PHAs and the courts have contrib-
uted to the concentration of poverty in America's public housing.
Recent data, although in some respects incomplete, demonstrate
the severity of this concentration. 12 The median income of fami-
12 See 24 CFR § 960.205(b) (1992).
121 42 USC § 1437d(1)(4) (1991).
124 See Cordrey v Housing Authority of Holyoke, Civ No 80-C-881 (C D Colo 1980)
(failure to keep apartment neat and clean does not provide good cause for eviction); Na-
tional Housing Law Project, HUD Housing Programs at 14/3-14/5 (cited in note 120).
125 See Fuerat and Petty, The Public Interest at 100-01 (Spring, 1985) (cited in note
112) ("Formalizing the rules for evicting public housing tenants means that the process be-
comes much slower, more complicated, and expensive: As a result, even conscientious hous-
ing officials are more likely to avoid entering into eviction proceedings, and disruptive te-
nants can remain in place, forcing law-abiding neighbors to move . . ."). Since the late 1980s,
Congress and PHAs have sought to limit the procedural rights of tenants with mixed success
in the courts. See text accompanying notes 242-57.
126 Three sources of data about public housing residents will be used in this article. The
first is data collected by HUD from each PHA as part of the HUD Multifamily Tenant
Characteristics System ("MTCS"). This data, although not publicly available, was reported
by Lawrence J. Vale, Occupancy Issues in Distressed Public Housing: An Outline of Im-
pacts on Design, Management and Service Delivery, in Compilation (cited in note 29) (on
file with U Chi L Rev). The second source of data is from a survey of PHAs jointly under-
taken by the Council of Large Public Housing Authorities ("CLPHA"), the National Associ-
ation of Housing and Redevelopment Officials ("NAHRO"), and the Public Housing Au-
thorities Directors Association ("PHADA"). The survey results are summarized in Yves S.
Djoko and Wayne Sherwood, Report No. 92-3: Public Housing Demographics, 1992
(CLPHA, 1992) (on fie with U Chi L Rev). The final source is a special tabulation of results
from the 1989 American Housing Survey. See Connie Casey, Characteristics of HUD-
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lies living in public housing is extremely low-less than $6,500.127
Roughly three-quarters of all non-elderly families living in public
housing have incomes below the poverty level.128 Over one-half of
public housing residents have not graduated from high school.129
Well over half of all families receive public assistance;130 in some
large PHAs the proportion of households on welfare exceeds ninety
percent. 31 Longitudinal data show the dramatic concentration of
poverty in public housing. In 1974, about one percent of all house-
holds living in non-elderly public housing developments earned
less than ten percent of the area's median income; this proportion
has now swelled to twenty percent.13 2 In addition, a large majority
of public housing residents are non-white; roughly two-thirds of all
non-elderly families are black and nearly one-fifth are Hispanic." s3
Minority public housing tenants are more likely than white tenants
to earn extremely low incomes.'
Increasing concentrations of poor households in public housing
have also affected the demography of the neighborhoods in which
housing developments are located. A recent study by Douglas Mas-
sey and Shawn Kanaiaupuni demonstrates a strong relationship
between proximity to public housing and the existence of concen-
Assisted Renters and Their Units in 1989 (HUD, 1992) ("American Housing Survey"). For
further description of the American Housing Survey data, see text accompanying notes 174-
76.
127 See Djoko and Sherwood, Public Housing Demographics at 24 (cited in note 126)
(median gross income of families is $5,747); American Housing Survey at 68 (cited in note
126) (median income of households in both family and elderly developments is $6,571; eld-
erly households' median income is higher than families').
128 See American Housing Survey at 68 (cited in note 126). Two-thirds, of all non-eld-
erly households living in public housing are composed of a female adult and children. See
Vale, Occupancy Issues, in Compilation at 13 (cited in note 126).
129 HUD, Literacy and Education Needs in Public and Indian Housing Developments
Throughout the Nation 5 (1992).
130 American Housing Survey at 68 (cited in note 126) (57% of non-elderly families and
individuals receive welfare or supplemental security income).
1s Vale, Occupancy Issues, in Compilation at 12 (cited in 126) (based on examination
of 13 large PHAs).
2" Id at 6. Of 13 large PHAs examined by Vale, 10 report that a majority of non-elderly
households have incomes below 20% of the area median income. Id at 7.
1" See American Housing Survey at 44 (cited in note 126) (64.3% of non-elderly house-
holds are black; 14.4% are Hispanic); Vale, Occupancy Issues, in Compilation at 17 (cited
in note 126) (61.7% of families are black; 19.8% are Hispanic.). The discrepancies between
these estimates stem from the fact that the American Housing Survey does not delete His-
panics from its counts of whites and blacks, whereas Vale does.
1 IVale, Occupancy Issues in Compilation at 9 (cited in note 126) (25.6% of black
families, as compared to 13.6% of white families, earn less than 10% of the area's median
income).
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trated neighborhood poverty in Chicago. 3 5 The authors estimate
that the presence of a public housing development in a census
tract increases that tract's poverty rate by eleven percentage
points. 36
3. The consequences of concentrated poverty in public
housing.
Existing data show that public housing, particularly in large
cities, has increasingly become home to poor racial and ethnic mi-
norities, physically and socially isolated from the rest of the na-
tion.3 7 The consequences of this isolation are tremendous. In his
book, The Truly Disadvantaged,'s8 and several recent articles, 3 9
William Julius Wilson argues that concentrated ghetto poverty
generates problems different both in kind and in magnitude from
the problems poor people encounter in less isolated environments.
According to Wilson, a poor individual who grows up in an envi-
ronment without employed role models is more likely to have a
weak attachment to the labor force than someone who has regular
contact with employed persons. The absence of regular employ-
ment deprives the individual of his or her "perceived self-effi-
cacy.' ' 140  Lacking employment opportunities, individuals fre-
quently turn to deviant or illegal activities to earn income, further
distancing themselves from the labor market and middle class
135 Massey and Kanaiaupuni, 74 Soc Sci Q at 114-15 (cited in note 107).
I'l Id at 116. The authors attribute the increase in concentrated poverty to the immi-
gration of poor households rather than the emigration of the middle-class. Id at 117.
"7 See Adam Bickford and Douglas S. Massey, Segregation in the Second Ghetto: Ra-
cial and Ethnic Segregation in American Public Housing, 1977, 69 Soc Forces 1011, 1035
(1991) ("it is difficult to imagine a group that is more isolated from the mainstream of
American society than black residents of authority-owned, family projects. These projects
represent a federally funded, physically permanent institution for the isolation of poor mi-
nority families by race and class").
'" William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass,
and Public Policy (Chicago, 1987).
13 See, for example, Loc J.D. Wacquant and William Julius Wilson, The Cost of Ra-
cial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City, 501 Annals Am Acad Pol & Pol Sci 8 (1989);
William Julius Wilson, Public Policy Research and The Truly Disadvantaged, in Jencks and
Peterson, eds, The Urban Underclass at 460 (cited in note 65); William Julius Wilson,
Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations: The Challenge of Public Agenda Research, 56 Am
Soc Rev 1 (1991).
140 See Wilson, Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations at 10-11 (cited in note 139).
Social isolation may also deprive individuals of information about job opportunities. See
O'Regan and Quigley, 21 Regional Sci & Urb Econ at 290 (cited in note 73) (higher social
isolation is a significant factor in explaining unemployment among black youths).
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norms.141 In fact, poor black people living in segregated communi-
ties composed of similarly impoverished households may develop
alternative status systems in opposition to mainstream culture.142
Other people who live in the community and share similar views
reinforce these attitudes and behaviors. The "concentration ef-
fects" generated in these communities lead Wilson to conclude
that "[t]he issue is not simply that the underclass or ghetto poor
have a marginal position in the labor market similar to that of
other disadvantaged groups, it is also that their economic position
is uniquely reinforced by their social milieu."' 43 These concentra-
tion effects may become reinforced as the more stable and less im-
poverished residents flee public housing and the surrounding
neighborhoods.
Underlying Wilson's concentration effects hypothesis are two
somewhat different theoretical models of how neighborhood social
structure affects individual socialization. "Contagion" theories
analogize the behavioral patterns of the ghetto to pathologies that
are spread by peer groups once a critical level of poverty or social
isolation occurs.14 4 "Collective socialization" models, in contrast,
posit that young people are influenced not so much by peer groups
as by adults who live in the community and serve as role models. 45
Although recent empirical studies differ over which theoretical
model best explains the prevalence of high rates of teenage
childbearing, school drop-outs, and deviant activities in inner-city
communities, they do find a consistent relationship between social
isolation and these behaviors. 46
141 See Wilson, Public Policy Research, in Jencks and Peterson, eds, The Urban Un-
derclass at 472 (cited in note 139).
142 See Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation
and the-Making of the Underclass 170 (Harvard, 1993) ("segregation creates an environ-
ment where failure to meet the ideal standards of American society loses its stigma; indeed,
individual shortcomings become normative and supported by the values of oppositional
culture").
143 See Wilson, Inner-City Social Dislocations at 11-12 (cited in note 139).
144 See Christopher Jencks and Susan E. Mayer, The Social Consequences of Growing
Up in a Poor Neighborhood, in Lynn and McGeary, eds, Inner-City Poverty in the United
States 111, 113-14 (cited in note 65).
145 See id at 114-15.
146 Elijah Anderson, Neighborhood Effects on Teenage Pregnancy, in Jencks and Pe-
terson, eds, The Urban Underclass 375, 382-97 (cited in note 65) (describing cultural expla-
nations for teenage pregnancy in ghetto communities); Jeanne 13rooks-Gunn et al, Do
Neighborhoods Influence Child and Adolescent Development? - Am J Soc - (forth-
coming, 1993) (the presence of affluent neighbors decreases the likelihood that teenagers will
have children and drop out of school); Rebecca L. Clark, Neighborhood Effects on Dropping
Out of School Among Teenage Boys, 16-21 (Urban Institute, Dec 13, 1992) (rates of school
drop-outs among boys increase as the proportion of poor households in a community in-
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Although most systematic studies of Wilson's concentration
effects hypothesis have focused on inner-city communities rather
than public housing developments, the limited statistics that do
exist, individual case studies, and anecdotal accounts are consis-
tent with the theory. Public housing residents are increasingly de-
tached from the labor market. Only between one-quarter to one-
third of the tenants of large PHAs reported receiving income from
wages in 1991.147 Children often grow up without any realistic hope
of finding a job in the mainstream economy. 148 Crime rates have
skyrocketed in public housing developments; drug dealing and nar-
cotics abuse have reached epidemic levels.1 4 9 Violent crime and
gang conflict have become so ubiquitous that mothers often do not
let their children play outside or walk to school alone.150
Although physical deterioration, social distress, and concen-
trated poverty in public housing need not occur simultaneously,
many public housing developments, particularly those in large cit-
ies, tend to experience all three problems."5" This is partially be-
cause these three phenomena are causally related and mutually
reinforcing. Concentrated poverty generates social distress which
leads to greater levels of poverty concentration as the more stable
creases and as the proportion of households employed in middle-class occupations declines,
although the results do not support a contagion theory); Jonathan Crane, The Epidemic
Theory of Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out and Teenage Childbearing,
96 Am J Soc 1226, 1236 (1991) (as the proportion of high status jobs in a community de-
clines, teenage pregnancy and drop-out rate increase exponentially, supporting a contagion
model); Paul Osterman, Welfare Participation in a Full Employment Economy: The Im-
pact of Neighborhood, 38 Soc Prob 475, 486 (1991) (as the proportion of employed persons
in a community decreases, the likelihood that an individual resident will receive public as-
sistance increases).
147 See Vale, Occupancy Issues, in Compilation at 10 (cited in note 126) (nationwide,
30% of non-elderly households living in public housing reported receiving wages in 1991);
CLPHA, Public Housing Today at 16 (cited in note 26).
148 See Kotlowitz, There Are No Children Here (cited in note 4); Richard Dembo et al,
Crack Cocaine Dealing by Adolescents in Two-Public Housing Projects: A Pilot Study, 52
Human Organization 89, 95 (1993) (young drug dealers interviewed by authors "felt hope-
less regarding the likelihood of finding attractive, well-paid work"); Kirsten Gallagher and
Darryl E. Owens, Blacks' Plight: Growing Up Without Goals; Growing Up With Few Goals
Common In Black Neighborhoods, Orlando Sentinel Al (Nov 17, 1992) (describing public
housing community's "struggle with financial hardship and defeatist attitudes").
149 Langley C. Keyes, Strategies and Saints: Fighting Drugs In Subsidized Housing 53-
133 (Urban Institute, 1992) (case studies describing public housing drug problems in three
cities).
150 See Nancy F. Dubrow and James Garbarino, Living in the War Zone: Mothers and
Young Children in a Public Housing Development, 68 Child Welfare 3, 10-11 (1989)
(describing safety rules mothers in public housing give their children).
151 Compare Commission Report at 48 (cited in note 7) ("Importantly, there appears to
be a relatively strong relationship between the income of the residents of a public housing
development and the level of rehabilitation needs of that development.").
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tenants move elsewhere. Heightened social distress, in turn, is
often related to increased vandalism and physical deterioration.
Physical deterioration only speeds the flight of relatively higher in-
come tenants, creating a more impoverished and isolated
community.
III. THF, FUTURE OF DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING
In the remainder of this Article, I examine policies that have
been adopted or proposed to remedy the problem of distressed
public housing. I maintain the dichotomy between policies geared
to improve the physical condition of public housing and those
meant to alleviate social distress. Nevertheless, as noted before,
each of the policies discussed would affect both physical and social
distress.
A. Renovating Public Housing
Although the Housing Act of 1937 made no provision for reno-
vation, since 1980 the federal government has provided some funds
for the modernization of public housing under the Comprehensive
Improvement Assistance Program ("CIAP").152 Projects are eligible
if rehabilitation costs do not exceed 62.5 percent of Total Develop-
ment Costs ("TDC").153 A TDC is the amount HUD approves for
the cost of planning, land acquisition, and construction of a new
public housing unit.154 In 1987, Congress enacted a new moderniza-
tion program, the Comprehensive Grant Program ("CGP"), target-
ing PHAs that own 500 or more housing units. 55 Under CGP,
money is allocated by formula and may be used for expenses not
exceeding ninety percent of the applicable TDC. A final "moderni-
zation program, Major Reconstruction of Obsolete Projects
("MROP"), permits HUD to award funds that were appropriated
for public housing development for reconstruction of "obsolete"
152 See 42 USC § 14371(b) (1988).
153 For elevator buildings the proportion of TDC that would be covered is 69%. 24 CFR
§ 968.203 (1992).
15 24 CFR §§ 905.102, 941.201 (1992).
15 See 42 USC § 14371(e) (Supp 1991).
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projects. 5 ' Before 1992, MROP funded projects with renovation
costs between seventy and ninety percent of the applicable TDC.157
In its 1992 report, the National Commission on Severely Dis-
tressed Public Housing recommended numerous remedies for the
physical and social needs of distressed public housing develop-
ments. The Commission estimated that 86,000 units of public
housing (six percent of the total stock) qualify as severely dis-
tressed, requiring renovations that exceed sixty percent of the ap-
plicable TDC.15s The Commission recommended that Congress ap-
propriate 7.5 billion dollars over ten years to renovate this
housing.15 Because the cost of renovating severely distressed pub-
lic housing might exceed the cost of reconstruction, the Commis-
sion recommended that Congress permit PHAs to seek funds in
excess of one hundred percent of the applicable TDC. 60
In the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992,
Congress adopted some of the Commission's recommendations. It
enacted a new MROP program authorizing HUD to reserve up to
one-fifth of public housing development appropriations for the
renovation of obsolete projects.1 61 The 1992 Act expressly provides
that "[t]he cost limitations shall not be related to the total devel-
opment cost system for new development or to the cost limits for
modernization and shall recognize the higher direct costs of such
work."'
The Commission's recommendation that Congress appropriate
7.5 billion dollars to rebuild distressed public housing-regardless
of whether the cost of the renovation exceeds the cost of new con-
156 An obsolete project eligible for MROP must have vacancies of 25% or more, esti-
mated reconstruction costs between 70% and 100% of the applicable TDC, and the need to
go to Step 3 of HUD's viability review process. See 57 Fed Reg 27330, 27334 (1992) (Notice
of Funding Availability for MROP).
"I In 1992, Congress removed the TDC limit on renovation costs. See Housing & Com-
munity Development Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-550, § 111, 106 Stat 3672, 3687 (1992),
codified at 42 USC § 1437coj). See text accompanying notes 161-62.
18 Commission Report at 15 (cited in note 7).
Id at 18.
1'0 "[T]he costs of successfully rehabilitating and replacing certain severely distressed
public housing units have been higher than the costs of constructing modest replacement
housing, on which the TDCs are based." Id at 86.
"I Pub L No 102-550, § 111, 106 Stat at 3687. An obsolete project is defined as one
which (1) has a vacancy rate in excess of 25%; or (2) a cost for redesign, reconstruction, or
redevelopment in excess of 70% of its TDC; and (3) has an occupancy density in excess of
the neighborhood in which it is located,.a bedroom configuration that needs to be altered,
significant security problems, significant physical deterioration, or inefficient energy and
utility systems. Id.
I'l Id. Congress also enacted a program of competitive grants to revitalize severely dis-
tressed public housing. See id, § 120, 106 Stat at 3695.
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struction-is misguided. Nowhere in its report did the Commission
consider whether these funds could better be used for alternative
forms of housing assistance. In the remainder of this Section, I ex-
amine the objectives that should guide housing assistance pro-
grams and how various housing subsidies achieve these objectives.
I conclude that rather than pumping scarce resources into failed
projects, Congress should instead encourage the demolition of
physically distressed projects and, in most markets, replace the
lost units with demand-oriented subsidies such as housing
vouchers.
B. Alternative Forms of Housing Assistance for Low-Income
Households
Housing assistance programs are typically characterized as ei-
ther supply- or demand-oriented. Programs in which the govern-
ment builds new dwellings or subsidizes developers are enacted to
directly increase the supply of housing. Programs that provide re-
cipients of assistance with funds to purchase housing services
themselves increase the housing supply indirectly by stimulating
demand.
In addition to the public housing program, the federal govern-
ment has enacted several supply-oriented programs that provide
assistance to private developers. Some programs, such as the Sec-
tion 221(d)(3)163 and Section 236164 programs, subsidized the inter-
est rate that developers pay on loans used to acquire or build low
cost housing. These savings were expected to flow through to ten-
ants in the form of reduced rents. Other initiatives such as the Sec-
tion 8 New Construction16 5 and Substantial Rehabilitation1 6 6 pro-
grams guaranteed landlords who built or renovated housing a
stream of subsidies lasting from twenty to forty years. Owners of
Section 8 projects are entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the differ-
ence between thirty percent of their tenants' adjusted incomes and
the federally prescribed fair market rents for the units. Since the
mid-1980s, the major supply-oriented program has been the Low
Me' Housing Act of 1961, Pub L No 87-70, § 101(a), 75 Stat 149, codified at 12 USC
§ 17151 (1988).
1'4 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-448, § 236, 82 Stat 476,
498, codified at 12 USC § 1715z-1.
Ill Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-383, § 201(a), 88
Stat 633, 653 (1974), codified at 42 USC §§ 1437f et seq (1976), as amended at 42 USC
§§ 1437f et seq (1988).
266 Id.
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Income Housing Tax Credit Program. 7 Developers who agree to
reserve units for low-income tenants earn a tax credit whose value
is based upon the cost of project construction or renovation.,," In
1990, Congress also enacted the HOME Investment Partnerships
Program which gives local governments funds that may be used to
subsidize construction and renovation by both profit-motivated
and nonprofit housing developers. 6 9
From 1974 to 1990, Congress significantly cut funding for sup-
ply-oriented programs, replacing them with several demand-ori-
ented subsidy programs. One such program, the Section 8 Existing
Housing Certificate Program, 7 0 provides participating households
with certificates enabling them to rent homes from private land-
lords. If the homes meet minimum quality standards and do not
cost more than the federally prescribed maximum "fair market
rent" ("FMR"),' households participating in the program pay no
more than thirty percent of their income in rent; the federal gov-
ernment pays the balance.
Since 1983, Congress has increased funds for housing vouch-
ers, a slightly different demand-oriented subsidy. 7 2 Under the
voucher program, all participating tenants receive a subsidy equal
to the difference between thirty percent of their income and the
applicable FMR in their area. In the Section 8 certificate program,
6 7 Internal Revenue Code § 42 (1991). For analyses critical of the housing tax credit,
see generally Congressional Budget Office, The Cost-Effectiveness of the Low-Income Hous-
ing Tax Credit Compared With Housing Vouchers (1992); Michael A. Stegman, The Exces-
sive Costs of Creative Finance: Growing Inefficiencies in the Production of Low-Income
Housing, 2 Housing Policy Debate 357 (1991).
16" Developers who agree to reserve at least 20% of their units for households that earn
less than 50% of the area's median income, or 40% of their units for households with in-
comes less than 60% of the area median, are entitled to a tax credit equal to the present
value of between 30% to 70% of eligible rehabilitation and construction costs. The 30%
credit applies to developers who receive other federal subsidies. The 70% credit is for
projects that do not use other federal subsidies. Internal Revenue Code § 42(b). Recipients
must agree to maintain their units as affordable housing for a period of at least 15 years,
and other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code virtually guarantee that the projects will
be maintained as low cost housing for at least three additional years. Id, § 42(h)(6)(A), (D),
(E)(ii). The IRS must set maximum rents. Id, § 42(g)(2).
169 Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub L No 101-625, §§ 211-
226, 104 Stat 4079, 4096-4114, codified at 42 USC § 12701 et seq (1990).
170 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-383, § 201(a), 88
Stat 653, 664 (1976), codified at 42 USC § 1437f(b) (1988).
17 The fair market rent ceiling is the forty-fifth percentile of rents charged for existing
residences in a given local market area. See John C. Weicher, The Voucher/Production De-
bate, in Denise DiPasquale and Langley C. Keyes, eds, Building Foundations: Housing and
Federal Policy 263, 266 (Pennsylvania, 1990).
171 Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub L No 98-181, § 207, 97 Stat
1153, 1181 (1983), codified at 42 USC § 1437f(o) (Supp 1992)).
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the tenant's rent share is fixed; the government bears the burden
of a higher total rent and benefits from a lower total rent. In con-
trast, under the voucher program, the government's share of rent is
fixed; tenants whose rents exceed the FMR pay more than thirty
percent of their income for rent; those who rent apartments for
less than the FMR retain a portion of the subsidy.
C. Comparing Public Housing to Other Subsidy Mechanisms in
the Achievement of Housing Policy Objectives
Federal housing policy is motivated by a multitude of objec-
tives. In this Part, I compare the performance of three major forms
of housing assistance-public housing, supply-oriented subsidies to
private developers, and demand-oriented subsidies to low-income
households-in terms of how well they achieve four "substantive"
and three "methodological" goals that are generally considered to
be objectives of housing policy.'7 3 The substantive objectives are
affordability, housing quality, neighborhood quality, and neighbor-
hood redevelopment. The methodological goals are efficiency, hori-
zontal equity, and vertical equity. I conclude that demand-oriented
subsidies fulfll most of the stated objectives better than public
housing or other supply-oriented programs.
The absence of reliable data poses a major problem for studies
comparing the performance of various housing delivery mecha-
nisms. Some studies have compared a small number of government
programs, but few have compared all three forms of housing assis-
tance. Nevertheless, in 1992, HUD released tabulations of data
from the 1989 American Housing Survey ("AHS")7 4 comparing
public housing,- certificates/vouchers, and privately-owned subsi-
dized dwellings. 75 Although the first two categories of assistance
are clearly defined, the privately-owned category includes housing
that is subsidized by a number of different supply-oriented pro-
grams ranging from below-market interest rate loans to long-term
17' The distinction between "substantive" and "methodological" objectives differenti-
ates housing specific policy goals from objectives that are generally applicable to most, if not
all, government programs.
1'4 The AHS is a biennial survey of close to 50,000 households randomly selected
throughout the nation by the Census Bureau. The Census Bureau and HUD also collaborate
on an annual survey of metropolitan areas. Among the advantages of the AHS over the
decennial census are its greater frequency and more detailed set of questions about housing
and neighborhood characteristics. For a more detailed description of the AHS, see Schill, 67
Chi Kent L Rev at 822 (cited in note 64).
15 Unless explicitly stated, "privately-owned subsidized dwellings" refers to units
owned by private investors who receive supply-oriented subsidies.
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commitments of rent subsidies. The 1992 AHS tabulations provide
more accurate information about subsidized households than has
heretofore been available because the Census Bureau matched
each respondent against lists of subsidized dwellings instead of re-
lying upon the tenant to identify the program under which she re-
ceives subsidies. 176 Unfortunately, the Census Bureau has not re-
leased the raw data, limiting the level of analysis in this Article to
cross-tabulation comparisons rather than multivariate analysis.
1. Affordability.
Recent estimates indicate that affordability has eclipsed inad-
equate quality as the major housing-related problem among very
poor households. 17 7 Not surprisingly, all three forms of housing as-
sistance perform well in terms of providing affordable housing. Al-
though all three (except housing vouchers) cap tenant rent contri-
butions at thirty percent of income, the programs treat utility
allowances differently. Once utility payments are factored in, pub-
lic housing is somewhat more affordable than housing certifi-
cates. 78 No studies compare the housing expenses of tenants in
privately-owned subsidized dwellings to public housing tenants,
yet AHS data suggest that rent burdens for tenants of privately-
owned subsidized dwellings are probably lower. 9
176 See American Housing Survey at 3 (cited in note 126). The total number of respon-
dents under each category of assistance is as follows: public housing, 221; certificates/vouch-
ers, 440; subsidized privately-owned, 298. Id at 3-4.
17 In 1989, five million very low income households (households earning less than 50%
of their areas' median income) had "worst case" housing problems, defined as living in se-
verely distressed substandard housing or paying more than half of their income for rent.
HUD, Priority Housing Problems and "Worst Case" Needs in 1989: A Report to Congress i
(HUD, 1991). Severe rent burdens were the only housing problem for almost three-quarters
of these households. Id at ii.
178 See General Accounting Office, Assisted Housing: Rent Burdens in Public Housing
and Section 8 Housing Programs 1-2 (1990) (the average rent burden of public housing
tenants with utility allowances was 30.5% of adjusted income compared to 36% of income
for households receiving assistance under the Section 8 Certificate Program). The report's
authors speculated that the seemingly more generous public housing utility allowances
might be attributable to the difficulty PHAs encounter in collecting accurate utility con-
sumption data for recipients of Section 8 certificates. Id at 15-16. A study using a different
methodology compared rent burdens of tenants subsidized by housing certificates and
vouchers. As expected, rent burdens were somewhat higher for voucher recipients (35%) as
compared to certificate holders (31%). Mireille L. Leger and Stephen D. Kennedy, 1 Final
Comprehensive Report of the Freestanding Housing Voucher Demonstration 136 (HUD,
1990).
19 In 1989, the proportion of non-elderly households paying 50% or more of their in-
come in rent was 16.7% for public housing and 12.1% for privately-owned subsidized units.
American Housing Survey at 70, 154 (cited in note 126).
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2. Housing quality.
Although housing quality problems among low-income house-
holds are generally less severe today than in the past, "decent, safe
and sanitary" housing remains an objective of national housing
policy.180 The Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing
has estimated that approximately six percent of the stock of public
housing has severe physical problems. Similar evaluations of the
condition of privately-owned subsidized housing and the units oc-
cupied by recipients of demand-oriented subsidies are more diffi-
cult to come by. Both supply- and demand-oriented subsidy pro-
grams that make use of privately-owned housing require that the
leased accommodations meet specified minimum quality standards.
Nevertheless, PHAs have sometimes been lax in enforcing these
requirements.""- Table 1 provides AHS data on several structural
and neighborhood characteristics of subsidized households. Al-
though the proportion of public housing tenants reporting moder-
ate or severe physical problems is greater than the proportion of
similarly reporting tenants subsidized under other programs, the
difference is statistically significant only between public housing
tenants and tenants residing in privately-owned subsidized
dwellings."8 2
180 See 42 USC § 1437 (1991).
181 See, for example, Ayala v Boston Housing Authority, 404 Mass 689, 536 NE2d 1082
(1989) (PHA did not inspect Section 8 units for lead paint); Wallace v Holy Temple Homes,
Ltd., 1989 US Dist LEXIS 14439 (W D Mo), summarized at 7 The Authority 477 (1990)
(suit challenging continuing government subsidies to Section 8 developers despite project
deterioration).
181 Supply-oriented subsidies may be the best method to renovate deteriorated housing.
Although demand-oriented subsidies are likely to cause owners of properties to do minor
repairs, so as to bring their units into compliance with program requirements, see Ira S.
Lowry, ed, Experimenting With Housing Allowances: The Final Report of the Housing
Assistance Supply Experiment 25 (Oelgesclager, Gunn & Hain, 1983), such subsidies may
provide insufficient incentives for landlords to renovate very deteriorated buildings.
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Table 1. Housing, Neighborhood and Poverty Characteristics of Assisted Households
All Households
Privately-
Public Voucher/ owned
Housing Certificate Subsidized
House Has Moderate or
Severe Physical Problems
Mean Rating of Housingt
Neighborhood Problems
Exist
Crime Problems Exist
in Neighborhood
Problems With Bad
People Exist in
Neighborhood
Mean Rating of
Neighborhoodt
Household Income
Below Poverty Level
6.9**
8.1
49.3 42.0 41.5*
21.5 13.5** 15.8*
19.0 21.9 20.4
6.7 7.2*** 7.1*
67.9 65.0 48.9***
Non-elderly Households
Privately-
Public Voucher/ owned
Housing Certificate Subsidized
14.0 7.5**
8.0** 7.6
62.3 47.8*** 52.4
27.9 15.4 24.2
22.0 25.9 27.6
6.1 7.0*** 6.2
75.2 66.5 54.2***
*Significantly different from public housing at the .90 confidence level
**Significantly different from public housing at the .95 confidence level
***Significantly different from public housing at the .99 confidence level
Note: Unless otherwise specified, all numbers are percentages.
t Rating from one (low) to ten (high)
Source: American Housing Survey (1989)
When tenants rate their dwellings on a scale of one to ten,18
however, statistically significant differences emerge as families in
public housing respond less favorably than those receiving vouch-
ers or certificates. Families in public housing gave a mean rating of
7.2 compared to 8.0 for certificate/voucher recipients and 7.6 for
residents of privately-owned subsidized housing. In addition, as
Tables 2 and 3 indicate, when the rating scale is collapsed into
three categories, 16.3 percent of public housing families had unfa-
vorable evaluations of their housing compared to only 6.2 percent
of certificate/voucher holders and 6.1 percent of those living in pri-
vately-owned subsidized dwellings. 184
The highest rating is 10; the lowest is 1.
In comparing public housing to other subsidy mechanisms, I utilize subjective evalu-
ations by tenants and certain objective indicators contained in the AHS. Subjective evalua-
tions of housing and neighborhood quality may be criticized on the ground that individuals
are not truly aware of their feelings, are inclined to reduce cognitive dissonance, or are una-
ble to make meaningful distinctions among categories in a ten-level scale. Moreover, subjec-
tive indicators might prove unreliable if tenants have different expectations of subsidized
and nonsubsidized housing. For example, if tenants expect that the government should pro-
vide better housing than the private sector, comparing their ratings of public sector housing
to private sector housing might bias the results toward finding public housing less desirable.
Alternatively, if tenants have low expectations of government, the results may be biased the
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Table 2. House Ratings of Public Housing Tenants and Voucher/Certificate Recipients
All Households Non-elderly Households
Public Voucher/ Public Voucher/
Housing Certificate Housing Certificate
Unfavorable 11.4 6.0 16.3 6.2
Neutral 12.1 14.0 14.6 13.6
Favorable 76.6 80.0 69.0 80.2
p < .10 p < .01
Note: all numbers are percentages.
Source: American Housing Survey (1989)
Table 3. House Ratings of Public Housing and Privately-Owned Subsidized Housing Tenants
All Households Non-elderly Households
Privately- Privately-
Public Owned Public Owned
Housing Subsidized Housing Subsidized
Unfavorable 11.4 5.0 16.3 6.1
Neutral 12.1 16.1 14.6 21.1
Favorable 76.6 79.0 69.0 72.7
p < .05 p < .05
Note: all numbers are percentages.
Source: American Housing Survey (1989)
3. Neighborhood quality.
Since the 1949 Act, improved neighborhood quality has been
an articulated goal of American housing policy. What Congress has
meant by neighborhood quality has changed as neighborhoods
themselves have evolved. In the 1949 declaration that each Ameri-
can family should have a "decent home and a suitable living envi-
ronment, ' 18 5 Congress probably meant a neighborhood devoid of
slum housing, whereas the 1974 call for "spatial deconcentration of
housing opportunities" unmistakably meant economic and racial
integration. 1a8  One of the major advantages of demand-oriented
subsidies is that they permit households to choose their preferred
other way. Nevertheless, objective indicators of housing and neighborhood quality are diffi-
cult to devise, and it is unclear whether the metric chosen by the researcher would be salient
to the person whose views are being canvassed. I believe hat it is appropriate to consider the
stated views of the survey respondents rather than second-guess their validity or rely solely
on a scale of objective indicators that may have little relevance to them.
185 Pub L No 81-171, § 2, 63 Stat 413 (1949).
188 Pub L No 93-383, § 101(c)(6), 88 Stat 633, 634-35 (1974), codified at 42 USC § 5301
(1988). The objective of racial desegregation also underlies the Fair Housing Act of
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neighborhoods rather than limiting their choices to communities
already containing subsidized housing. Siting controversies over
both public housing and privately-owned subsidized housing have
resulted in much of the stock being located in less desirable areas
of town, frequently neighborhoods with high concentrations of
poverty and racial minorities. 1 7 Although housing vouchers theo-
retically enable poor households to escape these communities, their
ability to do so depends upon two factors. First, housing must be
available in better neighborhoods with rents below the FMR. Sec-
ond, housing discrimination must not block the ability of minori-
ties to locate housing and move into these communities.
A substantial majority of households that enroll in demand-
oriented subsidy programs secure satisfactory housing regardless of
their race. In 1974, HUD funded the Experimental Housing Allow-
ance Program ("EHAP"), an enormous demonstration project
designed to test the feasibility of a housing assistance payment en-
titlement program. 188 Three-quarters of the households that ex-
pressed interest in the program located satisfactory housing.118 Mi-
nority participation roughly equalled their proportion of the
eligible population, 190 although minorities generally had more
trouble securing adequate housing than did white households.19'
Households that received public assistance were overrepresented in
the program. 9 A 1990 study of households receiving housing
vouchers and certificates as part of a demonstration program in
seventeen large cities also shows that most enrollees obtained
housing that met program guidelines-sixty-five percent for
voucher recipients and sixty-one percent for those receiving certifi-
1968. See United States v Starrett City Associates, 840 F2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir 1988) (fair
housing encompasses both the goals of anti-discrimination and integration.).
,87 See text accompanying notes 104-11.
188 EHAP was authorized by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub L
No 91-609, § 504, 84 Stat 1770, 1786 (1970). EHAP actually included three elements: exami-
nations of the effects of housing allowances on housing demand and supply as well as a
study of the administrative costs involved in implementing the program. Lowry, ed, Experi-
menting With Housing Allowances at 1-7 (cited in note 182) (describing EHAP).
188 See Weicher, The Voucher/Production Debate in DiPasquale and Keyes, eds, Build-
ing Foundations at 274 (cited in note 171).
190 See Bernard J. Frieden, Housing Allowances: An Experiment That Worked, in J.
Paul Mitchell, ed Federal Housing Policy and Programs: Past and Present 365, 372 (Center
for Urban Policy Research, 1985).
"I Minority households were overrepresented among applicants for the program, but
had less success than white households in securing housing. See General Accounting Office,
Housing Allowances:.An Assessment of Program Participation and Effects 73 (1986).
"I See Frieden, Housing Allowances, in Mitchell, ed, Federal Housing Policy at 372
(cited in note 190).
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cates.19 s The 1990 data also show that when program participants
in New York City are excluded from the seventeen city sample,1 94
minority success rates are, on average, nearly equal to those of
whites.195
Although most recipients of demand-oriented subsidies obtain
housing that meets the minimum quality standards prescribed by
the government, the effects of housing certificates and vouchers on
mobility have been modest. Many EHAP participants remained in
their homes and used the subsidy to reduce their rent burdens.,9
Those who moved "tended to move within the same neighborhood,
although the study found a small tendency for households to leave
the poorest neighborhoods for those with higher socioeconomic
composition.191 Voucher and certificate holders studied in 1990
were more mobile than households in the EHAP program.19 s Al-
though households moved to neighborhoods they rated more
highly, the effects in terms of promoting racial integration were
See Leger and Kennedy, 1 Final Comprehensive Report at ix (cited in note 178).
For cities, such as New York, with barriers to market entry and unusually low va-
cancy rates, supply-oriented subsidies such as public housing may be necessary, at least
temporarily. See Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance:
The Case of Public Housing, 75 Cornell L Rev 878, 910-11 (1990). It is also conceivable that,
in some housing markets, public housing could be more cost-effective than demand-oriented
subsidies if private sector rents for minority households were inflated because of housing
discrimination. Id at 912.
1,5 Meryl Finkel and Stephen D. Kennedy, Racial/Ethnic Differences in Utilization of
Section 8 Existing Rental Vouchers and Certificates, 3 Housing Policy Debate 463, 480
(1992) ("outside of New York, once we control for site and other characteristics, racial dif-
ferences in success rates, which were small to begin with, essentially disappear"). The differ-
ence in success rates in New York City, however, was substantial: 64% of white recipients in
New York successfully obtained housing, but only 23% of blacks and 30% of Hispanics
found dwellings. Id at 477. The authors suggist that one reason is that fewer minorities were
able to qualify by remaining in their existing housing because the housing didn't meet pro-
gram standards. Id at 496. The authors also suggest that the tight housing market prevailing
in New York City at the time of the study (1985-1988) might have affected the findings. Id
at 498.
1" Frieden, Housing Allowances in Mitchell, ed, Federal Housing Policy at 375 (cited
in note 190) ("A general reluctance to move undercut chances for widespread neighborhood
mobility, but a sizable minority of families did move .. ."); Jennifer L. Stucker, Race and
Residential Mobility: The Effects of Housing Assistance on Household Behavior, in John
M. Goering, ed, Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy 253, 254 (1986) (in the demand
experiment, "the allowance had little or no effect on the percentage of households that
moved").
19 See Weicher, The Voucher/Production Debate in DiPasquale and Keyes, eds, Build-
ing Foundations at 282 (cited in note 171). See also Frieden, Housing Allowances, in Mitch-
ell, ed, Federal Housing Policy at 375 (cited in note 190).
198 See Mireille L. Leger and Stephen D. Kennedy, Recipient Housing in the Housing
Voucher and Certificate Programs 3 (HUD, 1990) (just over two-thirds of the recipients of
vouchers and certificates moved).
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statistically insignificant.19  Nevertheless, for households that
moved, there was a statistically significant increase in the average
per capita income of their new neighborhoods. 00
Table 4. Neighborhood Ratings of Public Housing Tenants and Voucher/Certificate Recipients
All Households
Public Voucher/
Housing Certificate
25.6 16.2
17.0 16.8
57.4 67.0
p < .05
Non-elderly Households
Public Voucher/
Housing Certificate
32.2 19.5
18.2 15.4
49.6 65.1
p < .01
Note: all numbers are percentages.
Source: American Housing Survey (1989)
Table 5. Neighborhood Ratings of Public Housing and Privately-owned Subsidized Housing
Tenants
All Households Non-elderly Households
Privately- Privately-
Public Owned Public Owned
Housing Subsidized Housing Subsidize(
nfavorable 25.6 19.5 32.2 26.8
eutral 17.0 15.4 18.2 18.9
avorable 57.4 65.1 49.6 54.2
Note: all numbers are percentages.
Source: American Housing Survey (1989)
Data from the AHS, displayed in Tables 1, 4, and 5 suggest
that households receiving housing assistance through demand-ori-
ented programs live in better neighborhoods than other assisted
households. Sixty-two percent of the families living in public hous-
ing reported neighborhood problems such as crime, noise, and the
existence of "bad" people, compared to fifty-two percent of those
living in privately-owned subsidized dwellings and forty-eight per-
cent of households receiving certificates or vouchers.20 1 Households
that received housing vouchers or certificates also evaluated their
"I See id at 5. On average black recipients moved from neighborhoods that were 76%
minority to ones that were 74% minority. Hispanic households, however, moved from neigh-
borhoods that were 73% minority to ones that were 63%-a statistically significant shift. Id.
200 "The average per capita income in tracts occupied by recipients who moved was 4
percent higher than that in the tracts in which they had previously lived." Id.
o10 The difference in reported neighborhood problems between public housing residents
and tenants of privately-owned subsidized dwellings is statistically insignificant.
Unfavorable
Neutral
Favorable
U
N
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neighborhoods more favorably than those who lived in public hous-
ing or privately-owned subsidized dwellings. Less than one-fifth of
the families receiving demand-oriented housing assistance had un-
favorable views of their neighborhoods compared to almost one-
third of public housing families and one-quarter of those in pri-
vately-owned subsidized housing.
4. Neighborhood redevelopment.
Since 1937, federal housing assistance has been used to elimi-
nate slums and advance community redevelopment.0 2 Although
some studies show that public housing does not blight surrounding
communities, 0 3 few would suggest that it increases property values
or enhances neighborhood stability. 04 Demand-oriented subsidies
are also unlikely to advance neighborhood redevelopment efforts,
since they are not restricted to particular communities. Supply-
oriented subsidies targeted to private developers in particular
neighborhoods seem the only practical way to achieve community
development through housing assistance programs. Indeed, several
cities have earmarked housing and community development funds
for nonprofit community development corporations to foster this
type of activity.20 5
202 See Schill, 75 Cornell L Rev at 903-06 (cited in note 194).
203 See California Dep't of Housing & Community Development, The Effects of Subsi-
dized and Affordable Housing on Property Values: A Survey of Research i (CDHCD, 1988)
(of fifteen empirical studies surveyed, fourteen "reached the conclusion that there are no
significant negative effects from locating subsidized, special-purpose or manufactured hous-
ing near market-rate developments").
20 Theoretically, public housing could be used to improve the quality of the neighbor-
hoods by replacing deteriorating buildings with newly constructed dwellings. Schill, 75 Cor-
nell L Rev at 910 (cited in note 194). Nevertheless, most empirical studies fail to find that
public housing enhances surrounding property values. See Hugh 0. Nourse, A Rationale For
Government Intervention in Housing: The External Benefit of Good Housing, Particularly
with Respect to Neighborhood Property Values, in HUD, 1 Housing in the Seventies:
Working Papers 243, 250 (HUD, 1976) ("There is no evidence supporting subsidization of
the poor in standard quality housing in order to improve surrounding property values.").
But see William A. Rabiega, Ta-Win Lin, and Linda M. Robinson, The Property Value
Impacts of Public Housing Projects in Low and Moderate Density Residential Neighbor-
hoods, 60 Land Econ 174, 178 (1984) (properties in Portland, Oregon gained value after the
location of public housing in close proximity, although gain was "quite small").
210 See Avis C. Vidal, Rebuilding Communities: A National Study of Urban Commu-
nity Development Corporations 66-69 (1992) (describing housing activities of community
development corporations).
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5. Efficiency.
Efficiency is an important objective of any housing program,
especially when the resources available for social programs are as
limited as they are today. This analysis defines an efficient housing
program as one that employs the fewest resources in achieving its
substantive objectives. Public housing receives relatively low marks
for efficiency, regardless of whether one analyzes the program from
a theoretical or empirical vantage point.206 The government is fre-
quently considered to be an inefficient provider of goods and ser-
vices, for only private entrepreneurs will be driven by the profit
motive to minimize costs and maximize productivity.2 0 7 Even
where the beneficial owners of the privately-owned enterprises
have ceded day-to-day control to management, the existence of
transferable property rights creates strong incentives for the own-
ers to monitor the business.20 8 Similar incentives for cost reduction
and careful monitoring do not exist or exist in only an attenuated
fashion in the public sector because individual taxpayers do not
have a direct claim to the surplus produced by efficient govern-
ment operation.
Preference aggregation under democratic regimes and bureau-
cratic self-interest also contribute to public sector inefficiency. Due
to collective action problems, narrow self-interested groups have
an advantage over diffuse majorities in influencing government. 0 9
Individual voters who favor a government program that would gen-
erate widespread benefits may lack the incentive to expend re-
sources in lobbying government because of high organizational
costs and the ability of non-participants to share in the benefits.
20 For a more detailed analysis of the efficiency of public housing, see generally Schill,
75 Cornell L Rev at 878 (cited in note 194).
"I See Louis De Alessi, Property Rights and Privatization, in Steve H. Hanke, ed,
Prospects For Privatization 24, 31 (Academy of Political Science, 1987) (public sector will
not minimize costs as does the private sector).
208 Cento Veijanovski, Selling The State: Privatization in Britain 85 (Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1987) ("private ownership plus remuneration by variable residual claims creates
powerful incentives and a self-enforcing system of monitoring of costs and performance");
Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 Am Econ Rev 777, 782 (1972) (same). But see Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gar-
diner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 8-9 (Macmillan, 1932) (the
separation of management from ownership reduces incentives for efficiency). In those in-
stances where individual owners fail to monitor management, the market for corporate con-
trol provides an additional safeguard against inefficiency. See, for example, Frank H. Easter-
brook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to
a Tender Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161, 1165-74 (1981); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J Pol Econ 110, 113 (1965).
209 See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard, 1965).
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Small groups of intensely interested citizens, on the other hand,
have lower organizational costs, can avoid free-rider problems, and
can thereby increase their wealth at the majority's expense. Rent-
seeking210 behavior by special interest groups generates inefficien-
cies associated both with the resources expended in lobbying and
with the diversion of public largesse. In addition, government offi-
cials may act inefficiently by maximizing the size and scope of their
bureaus in an attempt to enhance their prestige.2 1
The public housing program illustrates many of the theoretical
shortcomings of the public sector. Special interest groups, such as
the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Real
Estate Boards, undermined the effectiveness of the program by
persuading Congress to include income limitations, cost ceilings,
and the equivalent elimination requirement, all of which contrib-
uted to the physical and social deterioration that plagues a signifi-
cant portion of the public housing stock today.212 Organized labor
added to the costs of public housing by pressuring Congress to in-
clude requirements that PHAs pay prevailing wages to construc-
tion workers.213
Statistical studies and anecdotal accounts also suggest that the
absence of an incentive for PHA managers to cut costs has resulted
in waste. One comprehensive study of housing subsidies found evi-
dence of inflated expenses in the public housing program.1 4 In-
deed, the government could have saved money by purchasing hous-
ing from the existing stock rather than building it itself.2 5 The
authors also reported that the operating costs of public housing
tend to be approximately thirty percent higher than the cost of
210 See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking in James M. Buchanan,
Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds, Toward A Theory of the Rent-Seeking Soci-
ety 3, 7-8 (Texas A&M, 1980).
212 See William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government 36-42
(Aldine, 1971).
212 See text accompanying notes 34-50, 85-87.
2 See Schill, 75 Cornell L Rev at 904 (cited in note 194).
214 See Stephen K. Mayo et al, Housing Allowances And Other Rental Housing Assis-
tance Programs-A Comparison Based On The Housing Allowance Demand Experiment,
Part 2: Costs and Efficiency 151 (Abt Associates, 1980). The authors reach this conclusion
by capitalizing the rents that public housing would earn in the private market. They find
that the capitalized rental value of public housing is less than its development cost. There-
fore, they conclude that the housings hypothetical market value would not justify construc-
tion. Id.
215 Id at 154.
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operating similar housing in the private sector.216 Although less
systematic, newspapers and government auditors frequently un-
cover incidents of mismanagement, waste, and fraud. 17
Public housing and supply-oriented subsidies for private de-
velopers, may also be criticized for failing to facilitate monitoring
by consumers. Normally, the willingness of consumers to seek al-
ternative suppliers disciplines producers who price unfairly or offer
inferior goods. Supply subsidies, in effect, have two consum-
ers-tenants and the government. Recent scandals demonstrate
that government agencies have difficulty monitoring the use of
housing subsidies to ensure that they benefit low income te-
nants.218 Tenants are also unable to bring discipline to bear on
PHAs and private recipients of supply-oriented subsidies. Tenants
of public housing and privately-owned subsidized dwellings cannot
effectively threaten to move elsewhere since the subsidies they re-
ceive are tied to their units. They may also be unable or unwilling
to complain to local or federal officials because they fear eviction
or some other form of retaliation. One of the advantages of a de-
mand-oriented subsidy such as a housing voucher is that the ten-
ant will act as an effective monitor of housing quality.21 9
Virtually all empirical studies comparing supply- and demand-
oriented subsidies agree that vouchers and certificates are a more
"I See id at 170. See also Arthur P. Solomon, Housing the Urban Poor: A Critical
Evaluation of Federal Housing Policy 152-54 (M.I.T., 1974) (inefficient operating proce-
dures contribute to the low cost-effectiveness of public housing).
2 7 See Memorandum Summarizing HUD Inspector General Audits 1983-1989 (unpub-
lished, 1989) (discussing scope of possible audits) (on file with U Chi L Rev). See also text
accompanying notes 1-2, 56-62.
218 See generally, Irving Welfeld, HUD Scandals: Howling Headlines and Silent Fias-
coes (Transaction, 1992) (describing corruption of federal housing programs); William
Tucker, Housing's Subsidy Hunters, Wash Times F4 (Oct 6, 1992) ("incentive program[s] to
persuade developers to build new housing for the poor ... attract all kinds of fly-by-night
operators, hungry for shelter from the profit-and-loss system. These subsidy hunters extract
a few quick profits and then leave the federal government holding the bag").
1' Provided that moving costs are not prohibitive and that tenants are fully informed
of their right to habitable housing, recipients of demand-oriented subsidies can obtain hous-
ing elsewhere and retain the subsidy if the landlord fails to deliver appropriate housing. See
Michael H. Schill, The Role of the Nonprofit Sector in Low Income Housing Production: A
Comparative Perspective 30 Urb Aff Q (forthcoming 1994). Demand-oriented subsidies may
backfire if tenants and landlords collude to inflate the rent on an apartment and divide the
surplus. This problem is alleviated by the voucher system, which permits the tenant to re-
tain any surplus not needed to pay for housing and therefore instills incentives to shop for
the best value. Id. An additional inefficiency of supply-oriented subsidy programs is that
they do not permit tenants to decide for themselves how much housing they wish to con-
sume. Demand-oriented subsidies such as housing vouchers preserve an incentive for house-
holds to consume appropriate levels of housing because recipients save money by renting
cheaper apartments.
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cost-effective means of delivering housing assistance."' For exam-
ple, a 1988 Congressional Budget Office study estimated that hous-
ing an elderly household in public housing for twenty years would
cost the government thirty percent more than if it had given the
household a Section 8 certificate.2 1 Similarly, a 1980 comparison of
alternative housing subsidies concluded that subsidizing a house-
hold in public housing cost 50 to 112 percent more than providing
assistance through housing allowances.222
220 One fear is that demand-oriented subsidies will lead to rent inflation. Although eco-
nomic theory predicts that rents might increase in the short-run as a result of increased
demand, in the long-run developers should enter the market and construct additional hous-
ing. This additional supply will force down rents. In the EHAP Supply Experiment, re-
searchers found that in two test sites (Green Bay, Wisconsin and South Bend, Indiana), the
introduction of housing allowances did not cause inflation in the price of the existing hous-
ing stock. See Lowry, ed, Experimenting With Housing Allowances at 26 (cited in note 182)
(EHAP Supply Experiment "[h]ad no perceptible effect on rents or property values"); C.
Peter Rydell and C. Lance Barnet, Price Effects of Housing Allowances 20 (Rand Paper
Series P-6794, 1982) ("housing allowance program had virtually no effect on the price of
rental housing"). This absence of price effects was attributed to the repair of some units,
new construction, and an increase in occupancy rates. See Lowry, ed, Experimenting With
Housing Allowances at 20; Rydell and Barnet, Price Effects of Housing Allowances at 20. It
may also have been influenced by the choice of sites for the experiment and the fact that
less than half of all eligible households participated. See Chester Hartman, Housing Al-
lowances: A Critical Look, 5 J Urb Aff 41 (1983) (criticizing housing allowances because
they are "likely to least serve those who most need housing assistance").
22 See Congressional Budget Office, Current Housing Problems and Possible Federal
Responses 50 (GPO, 1988). The report also estimates that public housing would cost 8%
more than Section 8 new construction. Id. The analysis uses a 4% interest rate and assumes
that the household will be housed for a period of twenty years and that the units have a
useful life of twenty years without requiring rehabilitation. The assumption that public
housing has no residual value after twenty years probably leads the authors to overestimate
the relative cost of public housing.
222 See Mayo et al, Housing Allowances at 46-48 (cited in note 214). These estimates
are based on the cost of subsidizing an average, two-bedroom unit without considering vari-
ations in quality. In addition, the analysis assumes that the value of public housing fully
depreciates over 40 years. The authors defend this assumption on the ground that most
public housing depreciates rather rapidly and requires further modernization expenditures.
In addition, they estimate that even if their assumption of zero residual value were wrong,
such amistake would overestimate the cost of public housing by only 17%. Id at 27-30. See
also Urban Systems Research & Engineering, Inc., 1 The Costs of HUD Multifamily Hous-
ing Programs S-22 (HUD, 1982) (public housing and Section 8 new construction housing
cost 55% and 27% more, respectively, than unsubsidized multifamily housing). Stegman
suggests that the comparatively high development costs of public housing may not reflect
relative inefficiency, but instead the disproportionate number of single parent minority fam-
ilies that PHAs house. Community opposition and litigation with respect to site selection
may drive up the cost of public housing relative to other housing programs. See Michael A.
Stegman, The Role of Public Housing in a Revitalized National Housing Policy, in DiPas-
quale and Keyes, eds, Building Foundations at 333, 341 (cited in note 171). Even if
Stegman correctly attributes the higher costs of public housing to disputes over site selec-
tion, this explanation does not strengthen arguments in favor of public housing as opposed
to demand-oriented subsidies. To the contrary, since demand-oriented subsidies make use
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6. Horizontal equity.
Public housing has long been subjected to criticism because it
lacks horizontal equity. Housing assistance in the United States is
not an entitlement; some have likened it to a lottery.223 Those
lucky enough to be selected by PHAs receive significant help;
others receive no assistance whatsoever. Until housing assistance
becomes an entitlement,2 any method of providing subsidized
housing will violate the norm of horizontal equity. Nevertheless,
because demand-oriented subsidies are less costly than supply-ori-
ented programs they can serve more households. Therefore, on
horizontal equity grounds, housing vouchers and certificates are
preferable to public housing and other forms of supply-oriented
assistance.
7. Vertical equity.
In theory, if not in practice, most redistributive programs are
guided by the norm of vertical equity that provides that the needi-
est should derive the greatest benefits. Public housing performs
only marginally better than other forms of housing assistance
under this criterion. As Table 1 indicates, although proportionately
more public housing residents fall below the poverty line as com-
pared to tenants of privately-owned subsidized housing and certifi-
cate/voucher recipients, the difference between public housing and
demand-oriented subsidy programs is not statistically significant.
Furthermore, the performance of public housing on the crite-
rion of vertical equity will probably deteriorate in the future be-
cause allocating public housing to only the neediest families cre-
ates concentrations of poverty. To alleviate the social distress such
concentrations already generate, PHAs increasingly will need to of-
fer admission to households who are not the most impoverished.225
In contrast, demand-oriented programs targeted to the neediest
of existing housing, voucher programs eliminate site selection controversies. See text accom-
panying notes 185-201.
23 See Muth, Public Housing at 3 (cited in note 40). See also Edgar 0. Olsen, Housing
Programs and the Forgotten Taxpayer, The Public Interest 97, 104-05 (Winter 1982) (dis-
cussing inequities of supply subsidies). Waiting lists for public housing in many cities are
extremely lengthy; in some areas the wait for accommodations among eligible applicants
may exceed two years. See NAHRO, The Many Faces of Public Housing 61 (1990).
I" But see Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case For An Unconditional Right To
Shelter, 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol 17 (1992) (arguing against making housing assistance an
entitlement program).
'15 For a discussion of the recommendations of the Commission on Severely Distressed
Public Housing with respect to income mixing, see text accompanying notes 291-95.
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tend to alleviate rather than intensify concentrations of poverty,226
so government will not come under similar pressure to violate the
norm of vertical equity in allocating these subsidies.
C. Renovation or demolition?
The preceding analysis shows that demand-oriented subsidies
outperform public housing. Vouchers enable families to live in bet-
ter homes in more desirable neighborhoods, and are a more effi-
cient and equitable way to distribute housing assistance. The only
objective of housing policy that public housing better achieves is
affordability, but this difference is small and could easily be elimi-
nated by adjusting utility allowances.227
The superiority of demand-oriented subsidies strongly argues
against the recommendation of the Commission on Severely Dis-
tressed Public Housing that public housing be renovated even if
the cost of renovation exceeds that of new development.2 Instead
of pouring massive funds into rebuilding failed projects, the federal
22' A study based on late 1970s data concluded that the proportion of assisted house-
holds living in minority census tracts was much lower for recipients of demand-oriented
subsidies than for those who lived in dwellings subsidized by supply-oriented programs. See
Robert Gray and Steven Tursky, Location and Racial/Ethnic Occupancy Patterns For
HUD-Subsidized Family Housing in Ten Metropolitan Areas, in John M. Goering, ed,
Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy 235, 245 (cited in note 196). See also text accom-
panying notes 197-200.
221 Neither public housing, nor demand-oriented subsidies perform weli in achieving
neighborhood redevelopment objectives. Supply subsidies utilized by private entities seem
the only method likely to implement successfully a program of neighborhood renewal. See
text accompanying notes 202-205. Whether public policymakers should prefer profit-moti-
vated to nonprofit housing developers is debatable. Supply-oriented subsidies may generate
a market failure on account of the government's inability or unwillingness to monitor hous-
ing quality and the limited ability of tenants to discipline subsidized providers of housing.
See text accompanying notes 218-19. Nonprofit organizations have fewer incentives to be-
have strategically since they are prohibited by law from transforming public surplus into
private gain. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L J 835, 838
(1980) (describing the "nondistribution constraint"). Therefore nonprofit developers may be
the most trustworthy recipients of supply subsidies. See Schill, 30 Urb Aff Q (cited in note
219). Nonprofit community development organizations may also be able to achieve objec-
tives, such as community participation and empowerment, that private sector entrepreneurs
cannot achieve. Nevertheless, the absence of a profit motive, limited access to capital, and
small scale of their operations may offset some of the efficiency-enhancing properties of
nonprofit developers.
228 Commission Report at 81 (cited in note 7). The Commission does contemplate that
some public housing may have to be demolished to "thin out" some public housing develop-
ments. See id at 79, 82. Nevertheless, the Commission recommends that all units be re-
placed with supply-oriented subsidies. Id at 87. To avoid community opposition, the Com-
mission also recommends that replacement units be permitted in the same neighborhood as
the housing that was demolished, despite the fact that these neighborhoods already have
high concentrations of poor households. Id.
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government should carefully analyze the cost-effectiveness of its
actions. Decisions at the extremes present few problems. Renova-
tions that would exceed the cost of new construction should not be
undertaken regardless of the level of social distress at the develop-
ment. For projects with modest capital needs and low levels of so-
cial distress, modernization is desirable. Similarly, for socially dis-
tressed projects in need of extensive reconstruction, demolition
and replacement with housing vouchers is more appropriate than
reconstruction. For projects in between these polar cases, the gov-
ernment should carefully analyze whether the physical renovations
are cost-effective as well as the likelihood that social distress can
be alleviated by actions short of demolition.
Since social and physical distress are highly correlated,22 9 the
number of units of public housing that would be demolished under
these guidelines is likely to be significant. Although federal legisla-
tion does not unduly impede the ability of a PHA to justify demo-
lition, it makes actual demolition extremely difficult because of re-
quirements that the PHA replace demolished units. Under federal
law, the Secretary may not approve an application by a PHA to
demolish units unless he finds that
the project or portion of the project is obsolete as to physical
condition, location, or other factors, making it unusable for
housing purposes, and no reasonable program of modifications
is feasible to return the project or portion of the project to
useful life; in the case of an application proposing the demoli-
tion of only a portion of a project, the demolition will help to
assure the useful life of the remaining portion of the project
230
In most cases of severely distressed public housing, a PHA can
probably prove that the project is obsolete because of either physi-
cal deterioration or social distress. HUD is also unlikely to chal-
lenge a demolition request if the cost to modify the project would
be enormously high.
Nevertheless, before public housing may be demolished, a
PHA must develop a plan to replace each unit on a one-for-one
basis, using additional public housing or other supply-oriented
subsidies. HUD regulations also require that the housing not be
229 See id at 15 (the Commission "has noted a strong relationship between severe dis-
tress and modernization needs").
230 422 USC § 1437p(a)(1) (Supp 1991).
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built in neighborhoods with high concentrations of minorities.2 3 1
Only under certain limited conditions, may public housing units be
replaced with demand-oriented subsidies such as Section 8 housing
certificates. Prior to approving a replacement housing plan involv-
ing housing certificates, the Secretary of HUD must find that re-
placement of the units with supply-oriented subsidies is not feasi-
ble and that the supply of housing in the area will remain sufficient
for certificate holders throughout the period in which they will re-
ceive assistance. The Housing and Community Development Act of
1992 added an additional requirement providing that when 200 or
more units are demolished, no more than one-half of the replace-
ment units can be provided by demand-oriented subsidies. 32
PHAs may not, under any condition, replace public housing with
housing vouchers.
At present, virtually no replacement housing plans have been
approved that consist primarily of demand-oriented subsidies.233 A
HUD notice states that a tenant-based replacement plan is not a
"viable option" under the statute.2  The basis for this reluctance
appears to be the view that supply-oriented subsidies are almost
always feasible and that HUD is unable to predict future housing
market conditions.25
The federal government has an important interest in preserv-
ing its investment in public housing. Therefore, the statutory re-
quirement that HUD certify the project as obsolete and not sus-
ceptible to reasonable remediation seems prudent. Nevertheless,
the replacement housing requirements are unduly burdensome. 36
231 24 CFR §§ 880.206(c), 970.11(h) (1992).
2 Pub L No 102-550, § 116(b), 106 Stat 3672, 3693 (1993), codified at 42 USC
§ 1437p.
2" Interview in Washington D.C. with William J. Flood, Director, Modernization Divi-
sion, HUD, (Dec 8, 1992) ("Flood Interview") (notes on file with U Chi L Rev).
23 HUD, Notice No PIH 89-19 (PHA) 5 (Apr 11, 1989), renumbered as PIH 91-19
(PHA) pursuant to Notice No PIH 91-17 (PHA) ("Because of these stringent requirements
in the statute for use of tenant-based assistance under Section 8 as a replacement unit in a
RHP [Replacement Housing Plan] the Department does not feel that tenant-based assis-
tance is a viable option for PHAs to pursue in developing their RHPs.").
211 Flood Interview (cited in note 233).
226 Low income housing advocates, however, have charged that PHAs have evaded re-
placement housing obligations by permitting public housing to deteriorate and become un-
inhabitable rather than seek demolition approval from HUD. National Housing Law Pro-
ject, Public Housing In Peril: A Report on the Demolition and Sale of Public Housing
Projects 72-74 (NHLP, 1990). Several courts have held that tenants may challenge de facto
demolitions of public housing under federal law. Tinsley v Kemp, 750 F Supp 1001, 1009 (W
D Mo 1990); Concerned Tenants Association of Father Panik Village v Pierce, 685 F Supp
316, 324 (D Conn 1988).
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Community opposition to the construction of new project-based re-
placement housing may doom efforts to demolish distressed public
housing.17 Furthermore, the strong preference for supply-oriented
subsidies exhibited by federal law is unjustified in light of substan-
tial evidence that demand-oriented subsidies are more consistent
with the equitable and efficient attainment of national housing pol-
icy objectives.2 38
D. Alleviating Social Distress
In its report, the National Commission on Severely Distressed
Public Housing recognized that simply repairing bricks and mortar
will not relieve the distress that envelops many public housing de-
velopments.2 9 In recent years, Congress and PHAs have adopted a
four-pronged effort to improve the lives of people who live in pub-
lic housing. Programs have been enacted or proposed to reduce
drug distribution and use, extend social services and job training,
improve management and alleviate the concentration of poverty in
public housing.
1. Fighting drugs.
The increased use and sale of controlled substances in public
housing developments has dramatically worsened the lives of te-
nants. In addition to lives destroyed by addiction, drugs are re-
sponsible for much of the violent crime that victimizes tenants.
Battles between rival suppliers of drugs claim innocent victims and
cause residents to fear leaving their apartments. 4 e In addition, the
need for money to purchase drugs has led to increased levels of
robberies and burglaries.24'1
237 The recommendation of the Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing that
HUD permit replacement housing to be built in areas of high minority concentration may
decrease the likelihood of community opposition, but will likely set the stage for future
social distress. See note 228.
"' See text accompanying notes 173-226.
'13 See Commission Report at 3 (cited in note 7) (calling for "equal and significant
attention to both the human and the physical conditions").
210 Even remaining inside one's apartment is no guarantee of safety in some public
housing developments. See, for example, Patrice Gaines-Carter, In Drug Zone, Longing For
a Shelter's Safety; Shootings Turn Joy of Getting Home in SE Complex Into Fear For
Mother, 6 Children, Wash Post Cl (Jun 19, 1991) (describing bullets crashing through
apartment walls and windows); Jacquelyn Heard, Young Writers' Neighborhoods Have No
'Happily Ever After', Chi Trib BI (Dec 14, 1992) (same).
241 See, for example, Camilo Jose Vergara, Hell In A Very Tall Place, Atlantic Monthly
72, 75 (Sep 1989) (describing victimization of tenants in New York City public housing
project).
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Congress and PHAs have responded to the drug problem pri-
marily by seeking to evict tenants who possess controlled sub-
stances. In 1988, Congress passed the Public Housing Drug Elimi-
nation Act as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.242 Finding
that "drug dealers are increasingly imposing a reign of terror on
public housing tenants, 2 43 Congress required PHAs to include in
their leases a clause providing that any drug-related criminal activ-
ity on or near such premises, "engaged in by a public housing ten-
ant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other
person under the tenant's control," shall be cause for eviction of
the tenancy.244 Although the law specifically authorizes PHAs to
evict tenants for the actions of relatives and guests, apparently
without regard for the tenant's culpability,245 some courts have in-
terpreted this provision and those of analogous state statutes as
requiring that the tenant have some knowledge of the prohibited
activities. 46
For an eviction to promote safety in public housing, the evic-
tion must occur promptly. Before bringing a judicial action to evict
a tenant, PHAs are typically required to hold a grievance hearing
at which the tenant is entitled to be represented by an attorney
and present evidence.2 4 Prior to 1990, PHAs were permitted to
refuse grievance hearings if the Secretary of HUD made a determi-
nation that state eviction law would provide the tenant with due
process. In response to increasing drug use, many PHAs sought
and received waivers from the grievance procedure. In several
cases, however, federal courts blocked PHAs from streamlining
their procedures because state law provided inadequate discovery
2142 Pub L No 100-690 §§ 5121 et seq, 102 Stat 4181, 4301 (1989), codified at 42 USC
§ 11901 (1988), as amended 42 USC § 11901 (Supp 1991). For a critical analysis of federal
anti-drug strategies focusing on eviction, see Regina Austin, "Step on a Crack, Break Your
Mother's Back": Moms, Myths, and Drug-Related Evictions From Public Housing (unpub-
lished paper, 1992) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
242 Pub L No 100-690, § 5122, 102 Stat at 4301, codified at 42 USC § 11903(3) (1988).
244 Id, § 5101, 102 Stat at 4300, codified at 42 USC § 1437d (1988).
245 See, for example, Boston Housing Authority v Guirola, 410 Mass 820, 575 NE2d
1100, 1103 (1991) (upholding eviction of tenant whose guest stored drugs in the apartment);
Chavez v Housing Authority of the City of El Paso, 1991 WL 424554 *5 (W D Tex), aff'd,
973 F2d 1245 (5th Cir 1992) (granting eviction of tenant whose son engaged in criminal
activities).
246 Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County v Lacey, 322 Md 56,
585 A2d 219, 222 (1991) (upholding trial court's finding that tenant had no knowledge of
son's drugs, despite the presence of the drug in the apartment and drug paraphernalia in
tenant's bedroom).
247 42 USC § 1437d(k) (Supp 1991).
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and would deny tenants due process.24 In response, Congress
amended the law to provide that, in the context of grievance waiv-
ers, due process did not include the right to inspect documents in
the possession of a PHA. 9
Government also has begun to use in rem actions against
leaseholds to short circuit lengthy eviction proceedings. In the 1988
Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Congress amended the civil forfeiture stat-
ute to include public housing leases. 2 50 The forfeiture statute en-
ables the government to seize assets such as leasehold interests
upon a showing of probable cause that they were used to facilitate
a narcotics crime. In 1990, the Justice Department and HUD an-
nounced the Public Housing Asset Forfeiture Demonstration which
was to have taken place in more than twenty cities. Based on
sworn testimony from informants, U.S. Attorneys in these cities
would receive warrants from federal magistrates to raid apart-
ments and evict tenants. 51 In most cities, tenants were given no
notice that their apartments would be seized. 2  Later that year,
however, a federal district court issued a permanent injunction
prohibiting, except in "exigent circumstances," forfeitures without
prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.2 53 This limitation on
the public housing forfeiture program was affirmed by a federal ap-
pellate court in 1992.251
Although HUD and PHAs may no longer bring forfeiture ac-
tions without notice and an opportunity to be heard, forfeiture ac-
tions have proceeded in several cities. Nevertheless, a recent dis-
trict court opinion suggests that courts may be loath to require
tenants to forfeit their leases, especially in cities with severe
248 See, for example, Housing Authority of Jersey City v Jackson, 749 F Supp 622, 633
(D NJ 1990) (rejecting HUD's determination that New Jersey summary eviction proceedings
provide sufficient due process); Simmons v Kemp, 751 F Supp 815, 819 (D Minn 1990)
(holding that Minnesota eviction proceedings do not permit sufficient discovery).
219 Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub L No 101-625, § 503(a),
104 Stat 4085, 4184 (1991), codified at 42 USC § 1437d(k) (Supp 1991). The amended stat-
ute requires PHAs to give tenants an opportunity to review documents prior to a trial or
hearing.
150 Pub L No 100-690, § 5105, 102 Stat 4181, 4301 (1988), codified at 21 USC
§ 881(a)(7) (1988).
151 Note, Time for a New Battle Plan: HUD and the Drug War in Public Housing, 7 J
L & Pol 847, 856-57 (1991).
252 Id.
253 See Richmond Tenants Organization, Inc. v Kemp, 753 F Supp 607, 608 (E D Va
1990) (discussing Justice Department no-notice policy); Sharon Le Franiere, U.S. Alters
Plan to Evict Drug Dealers: Agents Move to Begin Seizing Public Housing Leases of Sus-
pects, Wash Post A5 (Jun 26, 1990).
2" Richmond Tenants Organization, Inc. v Kemp, 956 F2d 1300 (4th Cir 1992).
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shortages of unsubsidized, low cost housing. In United States v
Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Avenue, Apt. 1-C,2 5 the gov-
ernment sought the forfeiture of a lease held by Clara Smith, a
fifty-one-year-old woman who lived in a three-bedroom apartment
with eighteen of her children, grandchildren, and great-grandchil-
dren. The judge accepted as facts that drugs and drug parapherna-
lia were found in Ms. Smith's dresser drawer, that Ms. Smith
rarely left the unit, and that her granddaughter had sold drugs
from the apartment.256 Nevertheless, the court refused to permit
forfeiture of the leasehold. After noting the worsening housing cri-
sis in New York City, the court held that Ms. Smith satisfied the
"innocent owner" exception to the forfeiture statute. According to
the district court judge, Ms. Smith had established, "beyond any
doubt," that she had no knowledge of the drugs.257
Perhaps the most publicized efforts to rid public housing of
drugs, guns, and criminals have been those of the Chicago Housing
Authority. Since 1988, CHA officials have conducted "sweeps" of
public housing developments. 258 A sweep consists of a door-to-door
search for weapons and drugs. Afterwards, security is increased
and individuals must regularly identify themselves and submit to
searches.59 Sweeps have met with mixed reactions in Chicago.
Newspaper accounts suggest that many tenants are grateful for the
increased security,2 0 while others complain that warrantless
searches violate their civil liberties. 261
Efforts to rid public housing of drug abusers and dealers,
whether in the form of evictions, lease forfeitures, or sweeps, no
255 760 F Supp 1015 (E D NY 1991).
258 Id at 1023-24.
'5 Id at 1024-25, 32.
258 For a description of public housing sweeps, see Comment, Operation Clean Sweep:
Is the Chicago Housing Authority "Sweeping" Away the Fourth Amendment?, 86 Nw U L
Rev 1103 (1991); Jennifer Lenhart, Crackdown, Touchup at Cabrini, Chi Trib Al (Oct 21,
1992).
2:5 Lenhart, Chi Trib Al (Oct 21, 1992) (cited in note 258).
26: See, for example, Louise Kiernan and William Recktenwald, City Gang Truce
Brings Hope, Lingering Distrust, Chi Trib Al (Dec 13, 1992) (tenants at the Cabrini-Green
project feel safer as a result of the sweeps); Lenhart, Chi Trib at 1 (Oct 21, 1992) (cited in
note 258) (police say "[w]e've had nothing but positive response from the residents"); Jen-
nifer Lenhart and John O'Brien, "We're Crying For Help", Chi Trib Al (Oct 15, 1992)
(tenant leader supports using National Guard to crackdown on crime in public housing).
261 See, for example, Lenhart, Chi Trib at Al (Oct 21, 1992) (cited in note 258) (tenant
states that "[e]very right I ever had in my life [has been] violated" by the gangs and the
government); Matt O'Connor, ACLU Hits Sweeps At Cabrini, Chi Trib at B5 (Dec 1, 1992)
(ACLU seeks to have the Chicago Housing Authority held in contempt for violating a con-
sent decree limiting searches of public housing units).
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doubt, improve safety, at least for a short time. In Chicago, from
1988 to 1991, violent crime in public housing rose at a rate below
that of the city as a whole.262 Even so, the number of violent
crimes increased by twenty-one percent over this period and the
number of crimes per one thousand people was much higher than
in the rest of the city.6 3 Enhanced law enforcement might improve
a horrible situation, but, alone, it will not, unfortunately, solve the
crime problems of PHAs.6 4
2. Enhancing social services.
The early proponents of increased government involvement in
housing envisioned that public housing would not just provide a
place for tenants to live, but also "a vehicle . . . for human devel-
opment. ' '265 Nevertheless, the Housing Act of 1937 made no provi-
sion for the delivery of social services. Indeed, the public housing
program's increasing focus on very low income households
(brought about by the Housing Act of 1949) was accompanied by a
directive from Washington that "[a] housing authority is not the
proper agency to provide personnel for direct program leadership
or supervision. ' 266 Only with the Housing Act of 1968, did Con-
gress begin to address the need for social services in public hous-
ing, authorizing HUD to make grants to PHAs for tenant services
including child care, job training, and counseling.267
' Violent crime in public housing increased at a rate of 21%, as compared to an in-
crease of 31% throughout the city of Chicago. Patrick T. Reardon, Without Sweeps, CHA
Crime Might Be Worse, Chi Trib Al (Oct 26, 1992).
'" An average of 54 violent crimes per 1,000 public housing residents were reported in
1991. The crime rate at some public housing developments reached 79.9 per thousand. Id.
For the city, the rate was 32.5 per 1,000. Id.
'" PHAs have adopted other initiatives to solve the drug problem in public housing.
These programs include drug treatment and intensive screening of tenants. See Keyes,
Strategies and Saints at 165-93 (cited in note 149). Congress provides funds for PHA drug
elimination programs under the Public and Assisted Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1990,
Pub L No 100-690, § 5123, 102 Stat 4301, codified at 42 USC § 11901 (1988).
2" Wood, The Beautiful Beginnings at 3 (cited in note 12). See also National Associa-
tion of Housing Officials, A Housing Program For the United States 25 (Public Service
Administration, 1935) ("In addition to control of the property, enlightened management is
concerned with the provision of community activities, if the projects are to be more than
mere structures, and are to provide a background for fully developed social and personal
lives for the families.").
266 Wood, The Beautiful Beginnings at 31 (cited in note 12).
16? Pub L No 90-448, § 204, 82 Stat 47, 503-04 (1968). The legislative history of the
1968 Act expresses Congress's concern with the increasing concentration of poverty in public
housing. "The need for additional services because of the constantly increasing number and
concentration of lower income, multiproblem families in public housing has been brought to
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After authorizing this social service funding, Congress did not
return to the intellectual roots of the public housing program until
1990, when it made a significant commitment to coordinating
housing and social welfare assistance. 6 8 The centerpiece of the so-
cial welfare provisions in the 1990 National Affordable Housing
Act' is the Family Self-Sufficiency Program.289 Each PHA that ad-
ministers a Section 8 or public housing program must institute a
self-sufficiency program, under which participating households re-
ceive services such as childcare, education, and substance abuse
treatment. Tenants sign five-year contracts with the PHA agreeing
to participate in social services and seek employment. To reduce
work disincentives, as a tenant's income increases, her rent either
remains constant or rises gradually.27 ° In addition to the Family
Self-Sufficiency Program, the 1990 Act provides PHAs with funds
to establish intensive social service programs such as Family In-
vestment Centers, which offer an array of social services and em-
ployment training programs in or near public housing
developments. 1
The provision of social services within public housing develop-
ments seeks to take advantage of the large numbers of eligible in-
dividuals in close proximity. These programs are too new for any
conclusions to be drawn about their effectiveness in improving the
economic mobility of public housing tenants. Nevertheless, a re-
cent evaluation of the first two years of a Baltimore program simi-
lar to Family Investment Centers demonstrates that putting social
the committee's attention . H Rep No 1585, 90th Cong, 2d Sess (1968), reprinted in
1968 USCCAN 2873, 2901.
2" See Sandra J. Newman and Ann B. Schnare, Beyond Bricks and Mortar: Reexamin-
ing the Purpose and Effects of Housing Assistance 28 (Urban Institute, 1992) ("If there is
any reason for optimism that housing may ultimately establish its potential as a vehicle for
economic independence, the 1990 Housing Act is it.").
219 Pub L No 101-625, § 554, 104 Stat 4085, 4225 (1990), codified at 42 USC § 1437u
(1990). This program is based upon demonstration projects funded by HUD in the mid- to
late 1980s: "Project Self-Sufficiency" and "Operation Bootstrap". David B. Bryson and
Roberta L. Youmans, A Passage From Poverty: Self-Sufficiency Policies and the Housing
Programs 10-12 (National Support Center for Low Income Housing, 1991).
270 42 USC § 1437u(d)(1) (1992). PHAs are also required to open escrow accounts into
which they must deposit the difference between the actual rents paid and what the tenant
would have paid in rent had the rents been set at 30% of income throughout the tenancy.
Once the tenant completes the program and moves elsewhere, he or she is entitled to receive
the contents of the escrow account. 42 USC § 1437c(d)(2).
271 Pub L No 101-625, § 515, 104 Stat 4085, 4196 (1990), codified at 42 USC § 1437t
(1992).
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services on site significantly increased tenants' use of these
services. 2
A locational fact-the large number of needy people all in one
place-makes the idea of a Family Investment Center feasible and
appealing. Nevertheless, location may also ultimately limit the
ability of social welfare programs to help households escape pov-
erty. Public housing projects are frequently not in close proximity
to the sites of employment growth in large metropolitan areas.
This spatial mismatch of employment and residence may diminish
the likelihood that tenants will learn about job openings and be
able to commute to those jobs that they do learn about.2 73 In addi-
tion, some empirical literature suggests that employers, operating
on the basis of stereotypes, avoid hiring people who live in commu-
nities of concentrated poverty, regardless of the individuals' per-
sonal characteristics. 27 4
3. Improving management.
For years, HUD has promoted the adoption of improved PHA
management practices. Nevertheless, management remains a prob-
lem at public housing developments throughout the nation.275
Since the mid-1980s, HUD has increasingly encouraged tenants to
manage their public housing projects. Resident councils have been
authorized to form resident management corporations and enter
into contracts with PHAs to manage individual projects. 2 6 Funds
have also been made available for technical assistance and the
training of tenant-managers. 7 As of 1990, resident management
172 Anne B. Shlay and C. Scott Holupka, Steps Toward Independence: Evaluating an
Integrated Service Program for Public Housing Residents, 16 Evaluation Review 508, 521-
23 (1992). Shlay and Holupka compared tenants living in a public housing development
with a Family Development Center to tenants in projects without an FDC. They found that
tenants who participated in the development center were much more likely than tenants in
the other project to take advantage of employment and training programs. Id. They also
report that participation in development center programs was associated with higher self-
esteem among participants. Id at 527.
273 See text accompanying notes 70-73.
174 Joleen Kirschenman and Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them,
But. .".: The Meaning of Race For Employers, in Jencks and Peterson, eds, The Urban
Underclass 203, 215-17 (cited in note 65) (employers associate inner city residence with
negative attributes); Kathryn M. Neckerman and Joleen Kirschenman, Hiring Strategies,
Racial Bias, and Inner-City Workers, 38 Soc Prob 433, 435 (1991) (same).
175 See text accompanying notes 1-2, 56-62.
275 42 USC § 1437r(b) (1991).
277 42 USC § 1437r(f).
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corporations had taken over the operation of fourteen housing
projects. 78
Advocates of public housing resident management have argued
that it can improve the efficiency, safety, and quality of life at pub-
lic housing developments,217 and can empower local residents to
take control of their lives. It is difficult to evaluate these claims,
since very few systematic analyses have been completed. One in-
vestigation, conducted by the Manpower Development Research
Corporation in the early 1980s, examined a tenant-management
demonstration program carried out in seven developments.2 8 0 The
results were mixed: tenant management resulted in enhanced em-
ployment opportunities, personal development, and higher levels of
satisfaction among public housing residents, but cost more than
management by PHAs.2 8 The report concluded that, "tenant man-
agement does not usually produce results markedly superior to
those stemming from conventional housing authority manage-
ment."28 2 Other studies of resident management corporations re-
port more favorable results including increased rent revenue per
unit, decreased administrative costs and reduced vacancies.83
In particular, a 1992 examination of eleven established resi-
dent management corporations ("RMCs") found that "full service
RMCs" performed as well as or better than PHAs on most man-
agement performance and cost-effectiveness criteria.2 84 Surveys of
278 Mittie Olion Chandler, What Have We Learned from Public Housing Resident
Management?, 6 J Planning Literature 136, 141 (1991).
279 See David Caprara and Bill Alexander, Empowering Residents of Public Housing: A
Resource Guide for Resident Management 1-2, 8 (National Center for Neighborhood Enter-
prise, 1989). For a discussion of the ambiguity of the "empowerment" concept, see Schill, 30
Urb Aff Q (cited in note 219).
280 Manpower Demonstration Research Corp., Tenant Management: Findings From A
Three-Year Experiment in Public Housing (Ballinger, 1981).
281 Id at 6.
282 Id at 5.
2' Caprara and Alexander, Empowering Residents at 8 (cited in note 279); Robert L.
Woodson and Rosalind R. Inge, Cost Benefit Analysis of the Kenilworth-Parkside Public
Housing Resident Management Corporation: Executive Summary 1, 3 (1986) (based upon
Coopers & Lybrand analysis).
28 See ICF Inc., Evaluation of Resident Management in Public Housing 4-8 (HUD,
1992). Of the eleven tenant-managed public housing developments, six had functions that
included maintenance, rent collection, and financial control. The authors also examined five
developments where, in contrast to the six full service RMCs, the RMC had responsibility
for management, but not finances. The physical condition of the developments managed by
full service RMCs was generally worse than those controlled by managing-agent RMCs;
therefore, the experience of these developments is more likely to be relevant to the question
of whether resident management can improve severely distressed public housing. Id at 3-4.
For each of the eleven RMC-managed developments, the authors compared data obtained
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residents living in developments managed by full service RMCs
and PHAs showed statistically significant higher levels of satisfac-
tion among RMC tenants with respect to management, mainte-
nance, and social conditions.285 Tenants of developments managed
by RMCs did not, however, respond more favorably than other
PHA tenants with respect to a series of questions measuring gen-
eral outlook on life and personal empowerment.28
6
In 1992, Congress gave tenants of distressed public housing
additional responsibility, empowering the resident council of a dis-
tressed public housing development to request that the Secretary
of HUD transfer management authority to an eiitity chosen by the
council.287 Eligible management organizations include nonprofit or-
ganizations, government agencies, and, certain profit-motivated
companies."" Whether private managers can succeed where PHAs
have failed remains to be seen,"' although the mere threat of a
loss of management might improve existing PHAs' performance.2 90
with data from a control development in the same community and with data from the entire
PHA. Id at 1-6.
285 Id at 8-1 to 8-16.
286 Id at 8-16 to 8-17.
187 See The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-550,
§ 121, 106 Stat 3672, 3701 (1992). Tenants may only apply to transfer management of se-
verely distressed housing projects owned by troubled housing authorities. A "severely dis-
tressed" housing project is one that requires major redesign or reconstruction, has high rates
of unemployment, teenage pregnancy, or educational failure, is in a location of recurrent
vandalism and criminal activity, and cannot remedy the problems through normal moderni-
zation programs. Id, § 120, 106 Stat at 3695. For a description of "troubled housing authori-
ties," see text accompanying note 57.
1" Profit-motivated management companies qualify if they form a joint venture with a
private nonprofit organization. See id.
1" In 1983, a study conducted for HUD compared the relative success of private man-
agement companies and PHAs in operating public housing. See Granville Corp., Public
Housing Authority Experience With Private Management: A Comparative Study (HUD,
1983). The study concluded that there was no statistically significant difference in operating
expenses with respect to urban family projects. Id at xi. However, the study found that sites
managed by private companies experienced higher rent delinquencies and twice the inci-
dence of crime and social problems as did those managed by PHAs. Id at 86, 94.
190 The United Kingdom has also attempted to inject the discipline of private markets
into public housing management. Nonprofit housing associations have been given the right
to acquire housing owned by local councils provided that a majority of existing tenants do
not oppose the acquisition. Helen F. Cope, Housing Associations: Policy and Practice 67
(Macmillan, 1990); Peter Kemp, Shifting The Balance Between State and Market-The
Reprivatization of Rental Housing, 22 Envir & Plan 793, 803-04 (1990). In addition, the
government has recently announced plans to require councils to place the management of
council housing out to bid. Douglas Broom, Private Firms To Manage Council House Es-
tates, The Times (London), Home News Section (Jun 8, 1992); Council Housing; Compul-
sively Competitive Tories, The Economist 34 (Jun 6, 1992).
19931
The University of Chicago Law Review
4. Reducing concentrated poverty.
The concentration of poor people in public housing underlies
much of the distress experienced by public housing residents in
large American cities.29 1 Rather than alleviating poverty and en-
hancing social mobility, as its early adherents had hoped, dis-
tressed public housing developments have magnified the problems
faced by poor families and kept them out of the economic main-
stream. As I discussed in Section I of this Article, the concentra-
tion of poor people in public housing is due in part to laws passed
by Congress that required PHAs to limit admission to very poor
households, grant preferences to the most needy, and evict those
whose incomes rose over mandatory ceilings. 92 The National Com-
mission on Severely Distressed Public Housing recently acknowl-
edged the problems generated by concentrated poverty. The Com-
mission recommended that Congress grant PHAs greater flexibility
in achieving a mix of incomes among residents. 3 In 1992, Con-
gress adopted this proposal by permitting PHAs to establish local
public housing preferences different from those in the housing leg-
islation.2 9 4 PHAs may use these local preferences to fill one-half of
their vacancies. However, despite this relaxation of targeting, the
continuing requirement that PHAs lease between seventy-five and
eighty-five percent of their units to very low-income households2 95
guarantees continued concentrations of poverty within public
housing.
Congress should further relax statutory requirements and per-
mit PHAs to achieve a greater mix of incomes in public housing
developments. Although granting priority to low and moderate in-
come households over very low income applicants violates the prin-
ciple of vertical equity, economic integration of public housing is
necessary to alleviate distress and prevent further decline. The
Chicago Housing Authority recently demonstrated the feasibility
of luring moderate income households to public housing. As part of
a national demonstration project,296 the CHA renovated two fif-
teen-story buildings in one of the most impoverished neighbor-
291 See text accompanying notes 137-50.
292 See text accompanying notes 80-99.
293 See Commission Report at 69-70 (cited in note 7).
294 See text accompanying notes 99.
215 See text accompanying notes 96-97.
219 The Mixed-Income New Communities Strategy ("MINCS") was authorized by Con-
gress in the National Affordable Housing Act, Pub L No 101-625, § 522, 104 Stat 4085, 4207
(1990), codified at 42 USC § 1437f note (1992).
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hoods in South Chicago and renamed them Lake Parc Place.2 17
Enough households with moderate incomes applied for residence
in Lake Parc Place to achieve a tenant population that is com-
posed one-half of households earning less than fifty percent of the
area median income and one-half of families earning between fifty
and eighty percent of the area median. Households with different
income levels are equally distributed throughout the buildings.2 98
Despite its success in Chicago, the allure of Lake Parc Place to
moderate income households may be difficult to replicate at some
public housing projects. In addition to its recent renovation and
below market rents, the development is located on Lake Michigan,
in close proximity to downtown. Nevertheless, public housing
could probably attract a large spectrum of households with modest
incomes, especially in cities with high market rents.
CONCLUSION
Over the past half century, the United States government has
invested substantial resources in building public housing. In an era
of limited funds for social welfare programs, cost-effective efforts
to preserve that investment are eminently sensible. Physical reno-
vations, reduced crime, coordinated social services, better manage-
ment, and more economically mixed populations all have the po-
tential to relieve the distress that envelops some inner city public
housing developments.
Nevertheless, the desire to preserve our investment in public
housing should not distract us from the fact that the program ex-
ists to serve people, not structures. Public housing, even with lower
2917 Chicago Housing Authority, Application to the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development to Conduct a Mixed-Income New Communities Strategy (MINCS)
Demonstration Program 7-8 (May 5, 1992) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
298 Interview in Chicago with Ameshia Hardison, Manager, Lake Parc Place (Dec 14,
1992) (notes on file with U Chi L Rev); Interview in Chicago with Daniel Hollander, Man-
ager of Program Coordination, Chicago Housing Authority (Dec 14, 1992) (notes on file with
U Chi L Rev). In the second phase of MINCS private developers will construct market-rate
housing on land near the housing project. CHA will lease one-quarter of these units and
sublease them to 141 very low income tenants selected according to rigorous standards.
These tenants will be expected to sign an agreement with CHA obligating them to partici-
pate in orientation programs, social services, and job training. During their residency in the
housing, increases in the income of the very low income households will not be counted as
resources available under federal law unless their incomes exceed 80% of the area's median
income. During the seven years of participation, CHA will deposit a proportion of each ten-
ant's monthly rent into an escrow account. These funds will be made available to the tenant
for home purchase, college education, or other approved purposes upon completion of its
participation in the MINCS program. Chicago Housing Authority, Application to HUD at
13-24 (cited in note 297).
1993]
The University of Chicago Law Review.
levels of physical and social distress, may impede rather than facil-
itate the economic and social mobility of the poor. Many urban
developments are located in communities with enormously high
levels of poverty and extremely low levels of economic opportunity.
A single-minded policy of public housing preservation, such as the
one adopted by the National Commission on Severely Distressed
Public Housing, may waste resources and bind public housing te-
nants to these communities. Government housing policies that fa-
cilitate mobility, such as housing vouchers, initiatives to reduce
regulatory barriers to affordable housing, and rigorous enforcement
of anti-discrimination laws, may, in the long-run, be much more
successful in enabling poor households to escape poverty.2 99
I" See text accompanying notes 185-200. See also Schill, 67 Chi Kent L Rev at 811-53
(cited in note 64) (arguing in favor of policies that would facilitate the movement of poor,
inner-city residents to the suburbs); Michael H. Schill, Race, the Underclass and Public
Policy, L & Soc Inq (forthcoming 1994) (same).
